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DISSERTATION ABSTRACT
Michael Jerman
Doctor of Philosophy
Department of Economics
September 2020
Title: Empirical Methods for Low-Quality Data
This dissertation presents methods for economic analysis in settings
characterized by sparse data. In the first substantive chapter, I show that
difference-in-differences estimators can be biased in the presence of treatment
externalities. I then develop a model that accounts for these externalities, and
estimate the model using data on Indian river pollution. I show that failure to
account for treatment externalities can substantially bias estimates toward zero.
I find significant reductions in measured pollution levels in the areas downstream of
sewage treatment facilities when compared to untreated areas.
Next, I propose a universal method for disaggregating count statistics.
The method is able to disaggregate regional statistics such as those collected by
censuses or surveys. I demonstrate the algorithm by disaggregating Ugandan census
counts of population, tabooda (kerosene lamp) usage, people consuming two or
more meals per day, and subsistence farms counted at the subcounty level (the
smallest administrative unit reported by the census). Out-of-sample validation
suggests that the procedure performs similarly for each statistic and that out-of-
sample errors are approximately mean zero throughout the distribution. When
combined with nighttime light luminosity data, the disaggregated data can describe
within-subcounty distributions of income and poverty. I find that this previously
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unobserved within-subcounty inequality accounts for 39.3% of aggregate observed
inequality. Next I show that the disaggregated census data can be combined with
satellite-derived air pollution data to estimate pixel-level estimates of pollution
exposure. I find that 22% of aggregate inequality in air pollution exposure is caused
by within-subcounty inequality in exposure.
Finally, I analyze the allocation of environmental resources following India’s
general election of 1996. Electorally competitive cities in the Ganges Basin during
this period were more likely to receive funding for pollution abatement from the
federal government of India. These same cities were less likely to receive increased
water pollution monitoring. The empirical findings are explained by forward-
looking policymakers engaging in clientelism. I emphasize the need for dramatically
increased water pollution monitoring along India’s rivers and streams.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
In much of the developing world, basic data on markets and economic
well-being are unavailable to researchers. In the economics literature, this lack
of information is usually addressed in one of two ways. First, much empirical
research relies on census, survey, or remotely sensed data that is aggregated over
a geographic region. These geographic regions are typically large, and therefore the
available data are unable to account for potential heterogeneity that exists within
the regions. Second, an emphasis on small-scale randomized control trials (RCTs)
has dominated the field of development economics. This method involves costly
on-the-ground implementation and monitoring of economic agents over a lengthy
period of time.
It is not my objective to disparage these existing methods, as they have
provided (and continue to provide) valuable insights. Instead, the purpose of
this dissertation is to promote a middle-ground approach to matters of economic
development and environmental economics. I present methods for utilizing existing
observational data sources that describe economic well-being and the effectiveness
of various environmental policies in the developing world.
In Chapter 2, I demonstrate how careful consideration of the data-generating
process can yield robust causal estimates in complex environmental settings.
Specifically, I analyze the effectiveness of sewage treatment plants constructed
in India as part of the National River Conservation Plan on measured pollution
levels in India’s rivers. The typical difference-in-differences estimator is shown to
be biased toward zero in this setting, but a spatial model that explicitly accounts
for the downstream persistence of pollution levels provides more robust estimates
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in the presence of these spatial spillovers. Using a novel spatial model that
takes advantage of the unique data environment, I show that pollution levels are
observably lower after the construction of sewage treatment plants. These results
contrast with the previously existing literature and with popular perception in
India, which both suggest that sewage treatment plants are ineffective at reducing
pollution.
Chapter 3 proposes a general algorithm to disaggregate economic and
demographic statistics. Most data in the developing world are aggregated over some
geographic region, such as census counts reported for census-defined districts or
survey data that are representative at the level of some political jurisdiction (such
as state or county). I show that freely available satellite data can be utilized to
disaggregate count statistics within the geographic region over which the data are
originally reported—a method known as dasymetric mapping. The algorithm is a
modification of an expectation-maximization algorithm that utilizes a nonlinear
random forest model to estimate the relationship between raw satellite imagery
and the pixel-level counts. I demonstrate that this nonparametric approach is
extremely flexible and is capable of disaggregating a variety of count statistics
from the Ugandan census of 2014, including population, households whose primary
source of lighting is kerosene lamps, subsistence farmers, and counts of people
who consume two or more meals per day. I also show that the disaggregated
population data can be combined with other satellite-derived resources to create
high-resolution estimates of per-capita economic activity (as proxied by nighttime
light luminosity) and per-capita pollution exposure. These estimates suggest a high
degree of within-region heterogeneity of important economic variables in Uganda
that were previously unobserved across an entire national region.
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Chapter 4 returns to the India setting to analyze vote-buying behavior
following the parliamentary election of 1996. This election was historically
significant in that it ushered in a new era of political instability and was the first of
four highly competitive elections that would occur within the next five years. This
instability created numerous incentives for vote-buying and other clientelist policies.
I find that cities in parliamentary districts that had competitive electoral outcomes
(defined as an electoral margin of victory less than 3%) were more likely to receive
federal funding for pollution-abatement projects. These findings are robust to a
variety of specifications and the inclusion of additional variables that control for
the economic, geographic, and political characteristics of this set of cities. These
results indicate that policymakers should consider non-environmental factors when
allocating environmental resources. However, the environmental and economic cost
of this inefficiency is unknown. I conclude that marginal data-collection efforts
should emphasize pollution monitoring.
3
CHAPTER II
MEASURING THE EFFECTS OF POLLUTION ABATEMENT IN THE
PRESENCE OF TREATMENT EXTERNALITIES: AN EXAMPLE USING
INDIAN DATA
Introduction
The differences-in-differences estimator is commonly used when estimating
the average treatment effect of a policy change. However, spillovers (or
externalities) occur when treatment affects observations that are not directly
targeted by the policy. These spillovers can contaminate the control group in a
differences-in-differences setting, therefore leading to biased estimates of the true
treatment effect. In this paper, I address this issue in the context of river pollution
abatement in India. I find that failing to account for treatment spillovers can
substantially bias differences-in-differences estimates in this setting, leading to
conclusions that differ from those reported in Greenstone and Hanna (2014) , with
different implications for policy.
There are 14,780 sewage treatment plants in the United States (The Center
for Sustainable Systems, 2015). India, with four times the population, has just 234
(Mauskar, 2008). In 2011, India’s Ministry of Environment and Forests estimated
that existing sewage treatment plants have the capacity to treat less than one third
of all municipal sewage. In most cases, untreated sewage is discharged directly in to
a river or other body of water.
The dangerous pollution levels in India’s waterways constitute a public
health disaster. Millions of Indian citizens rely on polluted rivers for drinking
water, bathing, and cleaning. In addition, many rivers are considered holy in
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the Hindu faith and are believed to have purifying effects. Each year, millions of
pilgrims ceremonially drink from, and bathe in, polluted rivers.
India’s government is aware of the problem and has taken steps to address
it. Beginning in 1985 under the Ganga Action Plan, 865 billion USD has been
allocated for reducing river pollution across the country. However, it is widely
held that the various cleanup schemes implemented by the government have been
a failure (The Hindu, 2004). In a 2009 interview, Minister of State for Environment
and Forests Jairam Ramesh stated that widescale changes to the government’s
approach were needed or else resources would “continue to be wasted” (S. Yadav,
2009).
Despite this popular perception, there has been no systematic study of the
effectiveness of any specific policy intervention at the national level. This paper
addresses this gap by estimating the effect of new sewage treatment plant (STP)
construction on pollution levels in India’s rivers. Over one hundred new STPs
were built as part of the National River Conservation Plan (NRCP) in 1995 at
various locations around India. I estimate the effects of these STPs on pollution
levels using data from the Central Pollution Control Board’s network of river
monitoring stations. In a preview of the main results, I find that STP construction
is associated with a small but significant decrease in pollution levels, but the effects
diminish in the long run.
The findings presented here are directly relevant to Indian policymakers.
Despite the perception of waste and ineffectiveness, I find that STP construction
can potentially reduce pollution to levels that are considered safe for bathing and
recreational activity.
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The baseline result is shown using a simple differences-in-differences
approach implemented with OLS, as is standard in the development literature
(Greenstone & Jack, 2015). However, the existence of treatment externalities
confounds identification in unpredictable ways. Aquatic pollutants mix non-
uniformly across space; pollution generated at one point along a river will be
present downstream, but natural remediation will work to reduce pollution levels
as the downstream distance increases. The existence of a sewage treatment plant
reduces pollution at the closest downstream monitoring station, but also reduces
pollution at all subsequent downstream monitoring stations. Failing to account
for treatment externalities can bias differences-in-differences estimators (Miguel &
Kremer, 2004).
Error processes may persist downstream as well. Any shock that directly
affects pollution levels measured at an upstream monitoring station will affect
all downstream monitoring stations. Failing to account for this downstream error
process can result in distorted inferences. I therefore develop a spatial econometric
model which allows both treatment effects and errors to persist downstream
(Anselin, 2013; LeSage & Pace, 2009). In a novel contribution to the spatial
literature, I specify an exponential spatial lag to capture the downstream effects of
pollution. Under this parameterization, the spatial model is equivalent to nonlinear
least squares with exponential decay of the dependent variable. This model is likely
to have wide-ranging applications in environmental and development settings, in
situations where treatment effects diminish exponentially over distance or time.
In the next section, I review related research in the environmental and
development literature. I describe the data in Section II. Section II presents OLS
estimation results. As outlined above, the covariance matrix of simple OLS models
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is likely misspecified if pollution persists downstream. The novel spatial model that
accounts for this error process is presented and estimated in Section II. I discuss
the policy significance of the results in Section II before concluding with Section II.
Related Literature
Greenstone and Jack (2015) highlight the importance of identifying (a) the
mechanisms that contribute to high pollution levels in the developing world, and
(b) which policy measures are effective at reducing exposure to pollution. They
emphasize that pollution abatement depends not only on the marginal willingness
to pay for abatement for those who are affected by pollution, but also on the
institutional environment that builds and maintains the necessary abatement
infrastructure. Large utility gains may go unrealized due to weak institutions;
resources may be misallocated to the extent that abatement measures are never
undertaken.
Water pollution is a huge problem in India, and the ability of the Indian
government to implement efficient water pollution abatement measures is analyzed
in Greenstone and Hanna (2014). They utilize a differences-in-differences approach
to estimate the average effect on pollution levels when certain cities are designated
as “problem areas” by the Indian government, relative to cities that receive no such
designation. They find that the problem-area designation is not associated with
any decrease in pollution levels, a result they attribute to the weak institutional
environment in India. The Greenstone and Hanna result serves as the starting
point for this paper. Here, I focus on a specific policy intervention involving the
construction of new STPs—which allows for a more precise identification of the
institutional shortcomings. In particular, I find that while STPs are initially
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effective at reducing pollution levels, these effects are short-lived, likely due to the
depreciation of physical and human capital.
In a similar study, Lipscomb and Mobarak (2015) use data from a Brazilian
water-pollution monitoring network to estimate downstream pollution spillovers.
They leverage exogenous variation in shifting county-border locations between
upstream-downstream station pairs (as a result of administrative redistricting)
to find that pollution generation increases as borders downstream of monitoring
stations move upstream; decentralized regulation and abatement authorities do
not internalize the downstream effects of pollution and abatement. Each station-
pair is treated as a unique observation in the data, and the authors apply OLS
with standard heteroscedastic-robust standard errors. As I show in Section II, this
assumes that the errors are unrelated across station pairs, an assumption that is
unlikely to hold along river systems.
In contrast to Lipscomb and Mobarak, I estimate the effects of a specific
policy intervention (i.e. the construction of new sewage treatment plants).
However, most of the existing literature on abatement focuses on air pollution,
rather than water pollution. For example, Fowlie et al. (2012) analyze the effects of
cap-and-trade schemes on pollution levels compared to the effects of command-and-
control regulation. They exploit spatial variation in the regulatory environment to
identify a significant decrease in pollution levels associated with the cap-and-trade
policy.
Using similar methodology, Auffhammer and Kellogg (2011) estimate the
effects of gasoline regulation on air pollution. Identification is based on spatial
variation in gasoline content laws across US states aimed at reducing ozone created
from volatile organic compound emissions. The heterogeneity of implementation
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across states allows them to identify which type of abatement measure is more
effective. They find that measures aimed at the specific volatile organic compound
emissions (those that are more likely to create ozone) are more effective than
general quotas on emissions, because general quotas allow polluters to substitute
toward other ozone-creating processes.
The effects of heterogeneous abatement compliance identified in these
previous studies are particularly acute in developing countries such as India. The
estimates in this paper suggest considerable heterogeneity across time in abatement
effectiveness. In Section II, I present evidence that a lack of operations oversight, as
well as capital depreciation, are likely to blame, echoing the types of findings in the
existing environmental literature.
The importance of using quasi-experimental settings when analyzing
abatement technologies is highlighted by Dominici et al. (2014). Identification
based solely on spatial variation in a policy intervention is generally not sufficient
to ensure unbiased estimates of a causal effect, since policies may be non-randomly
implemented. In the present context, the locations of new sewage treatment
facilities are likely to be non-random, but for downstream beneficiaries, the
effects are less likely to be endogenous. For example, the set of municipalities
that construct new STPs will likely share unobserved characteristics that impact
pollution levels. However, the pollution-generating processes downstream of these
cities are plausibly random and independent. If municipalities that discharge large
amounts of raw sewage into a river are targeted, other downstream municipalities
will derive benefit from the construction of an upstream STP, regardless of the
sewage generation and existing abatement technology present in the downstream
locations. As long as the unobserved characteristics common to locations with new
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STPs are orthogonal to the unobserved characteristics at the downstream location
of each monitoring station, Dominici et al.’s exogeneity condition is likely satisfied.
The downstream effects of sewage treatment introduce spillovers into a
differences-in-differences estimation environment. In a different context, Miguel
and Kremer (2004) estimate the effects of deworming medication for school
children Kenya in the presence of analogous spillovers. Children at schools that
are randomly selected for treatment influence the health of other children in their
neighborhoods—siblings and friends from untreated schools benefit from lower
hookworm and roundworm infection rates among their peers. The authors control
for this by including the total number of children who live within a certain distance
of the schools and the number of treated children within that same distance.
This specification accounts for potential bias in point estimates due to treatment
spillovers, but the estimated parameter variance-covariance matrix does not account
for the same spatial dependence.
The potential for bias when estimating covariance matrices is particularly
problematic in an environmental setting. Both pollution generation and abatement
have the potential to influence multiple locations (or individuals) simultaneously.
Spatial econometric techniques can explicitly account for for this type of
simultaneity, but they remain underutilized in both the environmental and
development literature.
Data
India’s Central Pollution Control Board (under the umbrella of the Ministry
of Environment and Forests) maintains a network of 447 river-monitoring stations
throughout India. Water samples are taken at specific time intervals (monthly or
quarterly), and then sent to regional laboratories for analysis. Data on various
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pollutants measured at each station were compiled by Greenstone and Hanna
(2014) . Their sample covers the period from 1986 to 2004.
These data also contain information on the geospatial location of each
monitoring station. The geospatial information consists of a low-resolution
coordinate (accurate to one minute of latitude and longitude—69 miles at the
equator) and a brief physical description of the site (for example, the name of the
bridge or public beach where the water samples are taken). I use this information
in conjunction with Google Maps and OpenStreetMap to pinpoint the exact
location of each pollution monitoring station.1 I then use the coordinates from
these locations to calculate the great-circle distance between stations. Each
monitoring station can then be plotted using OpenStreetMap, allowing the exact
upstream/downstream relationship between stations to be identified.
The 477 monitoring stations in India are located along 60 separate river
systems (see Table 1). Each river system therefore has an average of 7.45 stations.
For 28 of these river systems, there is only one monitoring station, while the largest
river system (Ganga) has 109 stations.
Variable Mean St. Dev. Min Max
Log of Fecal Coliforms 5.665 2.918 0.000 14.560
Distance to nearest upstream station† 52.410 61.178 0.278 385.700
Stations per river system 7.450 17.476 1 109
†Measured in kilometers. Upstream distance calculated only for stations with upstream
neighbors. Of the 447 monitoring stations, 148 have no associated upstream station.
Table 1. Descriptive Statisics
Not all monitoring stations are active during every year of the sample period
(Figure 1). New stations are continually added to the network, while some are
1Some monitoring stations could not be pinpointed using this method. In this case, the
river location nearest to the centroid of the coordinate range was chosen. This strategy was
implemented for fewer than 5% of all monitoring stations in the data.
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removed. The overall trend is toward more monitoring stations; there are 114
active stations in 1986, and 398 in 2004. As a result, the upstream/downstream
relationship between stations is not constant. Distance to the closest upstream
station can decrease as new stations are added, and can increase if data for the
closest upstream station are not reported in that time period.
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Figure 1. Number of Monitoring Stations by Year
Figure 2 shows the frequency of distances for each station’s closest
downstream neighbor (excluding those with no downstream neighbors). Roughly
62% of all monitoring stations have another station within 50 kilometers
downstream. Any pollution process with even a modest downstream persistence
is therefore likely to have its effects be observed at multiple stations in the sample,
potentially biasing a differences-in-differences estimator.
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Figure 2. Frequency of Downstream Distances Between Stations
The water samples at each monitoring station are tested for a variety of
pollutants and pollution indicators. The indicator utilized in this paper is the
count of fecal coliforms (fcoli) in the water. The advantages of this indicator are
threefold. First, fcoli is one of the most commonly used water pollution indicators
in the environmental science literature, and it is well understood to be closely
correlated with the overall health of a water body. Second, fcoli is the most
frequently reported pollution indicator in the sample. Lastly, fcoli levels are a direct
measurement of the amount of untreated sewage in the water.
13
Fecal coliforms are a class of coliform bacteria that grow exclusively in the
digestive tracts of mammals.2 Sewage treatment eliminates the food source, so
properly treated wastewater therefore has very low levels of fcoli. The levels of fecal
coliforms remaining in the water are thus the primary indicator for the effectiveness
of sewage treatment.
The counts of fcoli are generally reported in natural logs, a convention
I follow in this paper. In the laboratory, water samples are added to an fcoli
growth medium and left to incubate for a fixed period, after which the number
of colonies can readily be counted. The colony growth over the incubation period
is exponential, so taking the natural log allows for more robust comparisons of the
actual number of coliforms present in the water source.
Figure 3 shows the distribution of fcoli in the sample, across all
measurements at all stations. The dashed, vertical line represents the United States
Environmental Protection Agency’s “statistical threshold value” (STV) for fcoli
levels in recreational water (similar regulatory criteria for India, if they have been
established, are not publicly available). At this cutoff, recreational users of the
water are likely to fall ill due to fcoli contamination at an estimated rate of 32/1000
(EPA, The Environmental Protection Agency, 2012). Above this level, the EPA
deems a body of water to be unsafe for recreational activity.
Nearly half (49%) of all fcoli measurements in the sample are above
the EPA’s STV. Simply bathing in an Indian river carries a substantial risk of
contracting a waterborne illness. Since millions of Indian citizens also rely on river
water for cooking, cleaning, and drinking, the fcoli levels in India’s rivers represent
a significant public health crisis.
2Most forms of fecal coliforms are not harmful to humans, with a few notable exceptions. For
example, escherichia coli (E. coli) is a form of fecal coliform that can cause fatal illness.
14
E
PA
 S
T
V
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.000 5.768 15.000
Log of Fecal Coliforms
de
ns
ity
Figure 3. Sample Kernel Density Estimate of Fecal Coliforms
One of the primary objectives of the National River Conservation Plan was
the construction of new sewage treatment facilities. In 1995, 107 treatment plants
were built along India’s rivers (Tyagi, 2013). The location of each of these STPs
was obtained from the Ministry of Environment and Forests and satellite photos
from Google Earth. The spatial distributions of monitoring stations and STPs are
shown in Figure 4.
The effect of STP construction on pollution levels is identified based on the
location of the STPs. Fcoli counts at monitoring stations upstream of STPs are
compared to counts at monitoring stations downstream from STPs, before and
after construction of the STP is completed. The wide geographic dispersion of both
monitoring stations and STPs helps ensure that the estimates are representative for
India.
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Figure 4. Sewage Treatment Facilities and Monitoring Stations
OLS Results
Least-squares estimation can recover unbiased estimates of treatment
externalities if the spatial structure is properly specified. Robust standard-
error estimation, however, requires the variance-covariance matrix be properly
specified as well. In this section, I ignore the potential problems with estimating
the covariance structure and consider a simple, parsimonious model. Despite the
potential for biased standard errors, this estimation strategy is common in the
literature. The results reported in this section are best viewed as a baseline. In
Section II, we will see that the OLS estimates are quantitatively similar to those
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obtained from the more robust spatial model, though the OLS estimates of the
long-run effect are likely biased toward zero.
Näıve Difference-in-Differences. Following the approach used in
many development and environmental settings (Greenstone & Jack, 2015), I specify
a simple difference-in-differences model as a baseline. This approach measures the
treatment effect on the treated stations relative to untreated stations. This model
is written as:
Pit = β1Tit + β2(t ·Di) + β3(t · Tit) + τt + ψi + εit (2.1)
εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ),
where Pit is the measured pollution level at station i at time t, Di is a dummy
variable indicating whether station i is treated at any time in the sample, and Tit
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if station i is treated in time t. The parameters τt
and ψi are station- and time-specific fixed effects which control for any unobserved
sources of heterogeneity that are constant across time and stations. The term
β2(t · Di) allows for pollution levels at treated stations to evolve on a differential
trend from that of the untreated stations, while β3(t · Tit) allows for a structural
break in that trend at the treatment date.
In a “näıve” specification, each station is considered as treated if it
is located immediately downstream of an STP, and as untreated otherwise.
This specification will capture the first-order effect of sewage treatment on the
downstream station relative to all other stations. The indirect effects of treatment
on other stations downstream of an STP are assumed to be zero. Later, however,
this assumption will be relaxed.
Table 2 shows the results of the näıve differences-in-differences model
(equation (2.1)). Column 1 reports the treatment effect with no allowance for
17
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Dependent variable:
Log of Fecal Coliforms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Treatment Effect (β1) −0.388∗∗∗ −1.266∗∗∗ −1.165∗∗∗ −0.873∗∗∗ −0.759∗∗∗ −0.773∗∗∗
(0.066) (0.113) (0.115) (0.076) (0.118) (0.118)
Pre-treatment Trend (β2) 0.008
∗∗∗ 0.004∗∗ −0.002 0.004∗∗
(0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002)
Post-treatment Trend (β3) 0.006
∗∗∗ −0.013∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.003)
Post 5 Year Effect (βL1 ) 0.995
∗∗∗ 1.085∗∗∗ 1.499∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.105) (0.129)
Long-run Effect (β1 + β
L
1 ) 0.122
∗ 0.326∗ 0.7256∗∗∗
(0.073) (0.188) (0.206)
R2 0.620 0.621 0.621 0.622 0.622 0.622
Adjusted R2 0.613 0.614 0.614 0.615 0.615 0.615
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in parentheses. All regressions have 38,625
observations and contain time and station fixed-effects. Estimation results for equation (2.1) are in columns 1-5. Equation
(2.3) is reported in column 6.
Table 2. Näıve Differences-in-Differences Estimates
differential trends between the treated and untreated groups (β2 = β3 = 0).
The estimated treatment effect is small but statistically significant, indicating that
the average pollution levels at the stations immediately downstream of an STP
are lower, on average, throughout the post-treatment period relative to the pre-
treatment period.
Columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 report the estimates for the model with a pre-
treatment trend (column 2) and with both pre- and post- treatment trends (column
3). Over the entire sample period, stations immediately downstream of an STP
have a positive and significant trend in their pollution levels relative to other
stations (β2, the coefficient on t · Di). This result can be explained by noting that
the placement of STPs is nonrandom—it is likely that areas with increasing sewage
generation were prioritized for intervention by policymakers.
Specifying linear trends for the treated stations results in a much larger
(in magnitude) estimated initial treatment effect—that is, the treatment effect in
the first year following treatment. Furthermore, the slope of the post-treatment
trend line (β2 + β3) is steeper than the pre-treatment trend (β3 > 0). Taken as a
whole, the parameter estimates in columns 2 and 3 of Table 2 indicate that there
is estimated time-heterogeneity in the treatment effect. Large, initial reductions
in pollution are offset over time by an increase in the pollution trend of treated
stations.
The time-heterogeneity of the treatment effect can be analyzed by
interacting the treatment variable with a full set of year dummies:
Pit =
∑
τ
βτTiτ + δt + ψi + εit (2.2)
εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ),
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where Tiτ is a dummy equal to one if station i is treated in year τ . The sequence
{β̂τ} nonparametrically describes the time trend in treated stations relative to
untreated stations. These coefficients can be interpreted as treatment-specific year
fixed effects.
Figure 5 plots the estimated β̂τ ’s along with their 95% confidence intervals.
Due to the linear dependence in equation (2.2) (one dummy variable for each year
in the sample), the year 1994 (the year before the STPs are built) is specified as
the base year. Each β̂τ therefore measures the average level of pollution relative
to the level measured in 1994. The results are striking—stations immediately
downstream of sewage treatment facilities show a large, immediate decrease in their
measured pollution levels. But the effect is short-lived: pollution levels begin to
rise after three years, and are statistically insignificantly different from the pre-
treatment levels just six years after the STPs are built. The slight upward trend
in pre-treatment means reported in Table 2 can also be observed, although the
coefficients on the indicators for each of the years immediately preceding treatment
are statistically indistinguishable from one another.
The results presented in Figure 5 motivate the estimation of a specification
that distinguishes between short-run and long-run treatment effects:
Pit = β1Tit + β
L
1 T
L
it + β2(t ·Di) + β3(t · Tit) + τt + ψi + εit (2.3)
The new variable TLit is an indicator equal to one if station i is treated and t is
more than five years after the initial treatment date.
The estimation results are reported in Columns 4, 5, and 6 of Table 2. The
estimated coefficient on TLit is positive and significant in all specifications. In fact,
the estimated rise in pollution levels at treated stations between 1999 and 2000
is large enough to overcome the initial reduction between 1994 and 1995. The
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Figure 5. Treatment Effect by Year Relative to 1994
estimated level effect of treatment after five years is given by β1 + β
L
1 , shown in the
last row of Table 2. This effect is estimated to be positive and significantly different
from zero (at the 10% level) in all three specifications.
These results offer one possible explanation as to why the effects of the
NRCP have not been previously observed. Studies comparing pollution levels a
few years after the construction of an STP might find little to no effect, despite
the substantial decrease immediately following treatment. The potential reasons
for this mean-reverting behavior of measured pollution levels will be discussed in
Section II.
Treatment Externalities. The identifying assumption underlying the
näıve specifications in equations (2.1) and (2.2) is that the construction of an STP
impacts pollution levels only at the nearest station immediately downstream. As
discussed in Section II, this assumption is unlikely to hold. In particular, other
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stations farther downstream from the “treated” stations may also see a reduction
in pollution levels, though to a smaller extent than stations closer to the STPs
(if there is some recovery or a dilution process that occurs naturally). Estimated
treatment effects are likely biased in the presence of these treatment externalities,
since this effect amounts to a contamination of the control group by the treatment.
To account for this bias I consider the alternative specification:
Pit =
∑
s
Φn(dsi)T̃sit + τt + ψi + εit (2.4a)
Φn(dsi) = β0 + β1dsi + β2d
2
si + · · ·+ βndnsi (2.4b)
εit ∼ N(0, σ2i ).
The variable dsi measures the downstream distance of monitoring station
i from STP s. Φn(d) is an n
th-order polynomial of downstream distance (in
kilometers), which allows for treatment effects to vary over distance. T̃sit is new
treatment indicator equal to one if station i is anywhere downstream of STP
s in time t. For each monitoring station i, the distance polynomial is summed
over all upstream STPs. Each station can therefore be treated by multiple STPs
simultaneously.
The above specification considers all stations downstream of an STP
as treated. The intensity of treatment thus varies according to the number of
upstream STPs and the downstream distance of each monitoring station from each
STP (connected by a river system). In contrast to the model in equation (2.1),
this specification explicitly accounts for treatment externalities. Identification is
based on the number of upstream STPs and the variation in distances between each
station and each upstream STP.
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Dependent variable:
Log of Fecal Coliforms
Variable (1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
T̃sit −0.227∗∗∗ −0.454∗∗∗ −0.553∗∗∗ −0.338∗∗∗ −0.418∗∗∗
(0.020) (0.026) (0.046) (0.055) (0.024)
d · 1000 0.315∗∗∗ 1.422∗∗∗ 2.376∗∗∗ −0.981 0
(0.027) (0.082) (0.375) (0.615)
(d · 1000)2 −0.808∗∗∗ −2.607∗∗∗ 9.296∗∗∗ 6.412∗∗∗
(0.056) (0.690) (1.804) (0.485)
(d · 1000)3 0.892∗∗∗ −13.553∗∗∗ −10.505∗∗∗
(0.340) (1.991) (0.935)
(d · 1000)4 5.536∗∗∗ 4.484∗∗∗
(0.736) (0.448)
Polynomial Order 1 2 3 4 4
AIC 156214.1 156009.2 156002.5 155949.5 155950.6
BIC 162010.3 161814 161815.8 161771.4 161763.9
R2 0.621 0.623 0.623 0.624 0.624
Adjusted R2 0.614 0.616 0.616 0.617 0.617
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors in
parentheses. Coefficient estimates for distance measures (dsi) are scaled by a factor of
1, 000km. All specifications have 38,625 observations and include time and monitoring-
station fixed-effects. Estimation results correspond to equation 2.4a.
Table 3. Downstream Abatement Effects
Estimation results are given in Table 3. Column 1 shows the results of a
first-order polynomial specification (i.e. where the downstream effects are assumed
to be linear in distance). Both estimated polynomial coefficients have the expected
sign—initial decreases in pollution immediately downstream of an STP (d = 0) that
dissipate as distance increases.
It is unlikely that downstream pollution effects are linear in distance.
Column 2 corresponds to a polynomial order of two (Φ2(·)), the most parsimonious
specification that allows for nonlinearities. All of the coefficients are statistically
significant at the 0.01 level. The “treatment effect” estimate, β̂0, is the predicted
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change in pollution levels at the location where an STP is constructed (downstream
distance is 0 km). The point estimate of −0.454 is more than 10% larger in
magnitude than the simple differences-in-differences estimate reported in Table 2.
This indicates that failing to account for treatment externalities can substantially
bias point-estimates toward zero.
The polynomial specification also allows for the downstream effects to be
analyzed. Note that
∂P̂ 2s,t
∂di,s,t∂T̃
= Φ′n(di,s,t). (2.5)
The treatment effects diminish as downstream distance increases only if Φ′n(dsit) >
0. As expected, this condition is satisfied with the second-order polynomial Φ2(·)
in column 2—treatment effects appear to be larger when a station is nearer to an
STP.
The third-order polynomial of column 3 shows an even larger estimated
treatment effect than the second-order specification. In contrast, the fourth-order
results in column 4 differ substantially. Of particular interest is the non-monotonic
downstream treatment effect. (Φ′(dsit) < 0 when d < 60.5). This specification
predicts an initial increase in the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect
over the first 60.5 kilometers downstream. This result is driven entirely by β̂1,
the coefficient on dsit. Note that estimated sign is negative, indicating that the
minimum of the polynomial function occurs when d is positive. It is unlikely that
the true treatment effect reaches its maximum 60.5 km downstream of an STP
rather than immediately downstream. This observed behavior in the fourth-order
polynomial is probably due to overfitting.
The treatment effects estimated here reflect the average impact of
abatement. There is some heterogeneity across rivers and STP locations—
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rate of flow and river volume are unfortunately not observed in the data. This
heterogeneity may influence estimated downstream effects. Swift-moving water may
“carry” the treatment effect downstream more effectively than stagnant rivers. The
high-order polynomial specifications may capture some of this heterogeneous effect,
thus giving rise to unexpected (but statistically insignificant) non-monotonicity.
One way to address this non-monotonicity is simply to drop the first-
order term dsit from the regression (β1 = 0), since the estimated coefficient
for this variable is not significantly different from zero anyway. Results of this
estimation are reported in column 5 of Table 2. The results are qualitatively
similar to the other specifications, and all covariates are significant at the 1% level.
Furthermore, the BIC prefers the specification without the dsit term (column 5) to
the specification where it is included (column 4). The AIC, which is less sensitive
to additional parameters, shows only a marginal preference for the more inclusive
model. A monotonic downstream effect can therefore be estimated with little, if
any, loss in the explanatory power of the model.
The statistical significance of the downstream effect at any arbitrary
distance d can be ascertained by performing a simple F-test on the linear
hypothesis
H0 : Φn(d) = 0. (2.6)
Figure 6 shows the estimated downstream effects of abatement for each of the
specifications in Table 2, along with 95% confidence intervals. The estimates are
similar for all of the non-linear specifications (polynomials of order 2 or above). In
particular, the downstream effects do not become statistically indistinguishable
from zero until 300 or 400 kilometers downstream, indicating a high degree of
downstream persistence in the data. The non-monotonic downstream behavior
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of the 4th-order polynomial specification is also visible, but the initially wide
confidence interval indicates uncertainty about the true shape of the downstream
effect over the first 100 kilometers. This initial uncertainty is substantially reduced
when the parameter β1 is set equal to zero, as in the last panel.
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Figure 6. Treatment Effect by Downstream Distance
Spatial Model
The primary shortcoming of the OLS-based approach is its inability to
capture the complexity of the error process. Throughout the previous section, it
was assumed that errors were independent across monitoring stations, which is
unlikely to be the case. This study is the first to find an abatement effect at the
national level for STPs in India, so it is imperative to model the errors properly to
ensure that the inference is not merely an artifact of a misspecified error structure.
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Shocks to local pollution levels that are observed at one station are expected
to be observed (to some extent) at all other downstream stations as well. Thus
the error processes at stations along the same river are likely to be correlated.
Moreover, the extent of this correlation should be smaller for stations separated
by larger distances than for stations that are near to each other. This suggests that
the commonly used cluster-robust standard errors are unlikely to be adequate, since
within-cluster error covariances are not homogeneous for any level of clustering.
For instance, error clustering at the river level assumes that monitoring stations
located hundreds of kilometers apart along the same river will have the same error
correlation as stations separated by just a few kilometers. Similarly, errors clustered
at the individual station level assume that errors are independent across stations,
even those stations located within the same metropolitan area.
In this section, I assume that the process that describes the downstream
treatment effect is identical to the process that describes the downstream error
process. This assumption says that the amount of pollution observed at a given
distance downstream from a pollution source is the same regardless of the pollution
source. Permanent changes in estimated pollution, such as the changes that would
be observed after the construction of a new STP, impact downstream stations
in the same manner as do transient changes, such as a holiday that decreases
industrial production. In other words, the local effects of changes in the upstream
pollution generation process are the same regardless of the source of the pollution.
This type of spatial relationship can be captured by a “spatial autoregressive
model” (Anselin, 2013; LeSage & Pace, 2009).
To illustrate the spatial process, consider two monitoring stations, labeled
A and B, located on unconnected bodies of water. Each station has pollution
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observations in time period t = 1, 2, and an STP is constructed immediately
upstream of A at t = 2 (while station B remains untreated). The pollution at
each monitoring station can be described by
PA,t = βTA,t + τt + ψA + εA,t, εA,t ∼ N(0, σ2A) (2.7)
PB,t = β(0) + τt + ψB + εB,t, εB,t ∼ N(0, σ2B) (2.8)
Now suppose that a river (or canal) is “created” between A and B such that the
two monitoring stations are connected by a waterway, so A is now d kilometers
upstream of B. The pollution that is measured at A will also be present at some
level at station B (now downstream of A). The amount of PA,t that is present at B
is f(d)PA,t, where f : R+ → [0, 1] measures the proportion of pollution that persists
d kilometers downstream. Then we have
PBt = f(d)PAt + τt + ψB + εBt. (2.9)
Note that even though station B is untreated, the decrease in pollution at station
A will affect PBt through the term f(d)PAt.
The system can then be described in matrix form as
PA1
PA2
PB1
PB2

=

0 0 0 0
0 0 0 0
f(d) 0 0 0
0 f(d) 0 0


PA1
PA2
PB1
PB2

+ β

0
1
0
0

+

τ1
τ2
τ1
τ2

+

ψA
ψA
ψB
ψB

+

εA1
εA2
εB1
εB2

(2.10)
This equation can be written more succinctly as:
P = WP + βT + τ + ψ + ε. (2.11)
The matrix W is known in the spatial econometrics literature as a “spatial weight
matrix.” It captures the upstream/downstream relationship between monitoring
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stations and allows for measured pollution at upstream stations to affect measured
pollution at downstream stations.
Pollution shocks which occur at station A persist downstream and
are observed at station B as well, propagating through the matrix W . This
specification allows average pollution levels (through the idiosyncratic fixed
effects), as well as any pollution shocks, to persist downstream in a similar fashion.
Accounting for the error process in this way allows for more-robust inferences
concerning the parameter β in equation 2.11, where β̂ is the estimate of the average
treatment effect.
Estimation of (2.11) requires a specific functional form for f . One candidate
is the polynomial specification utilized in Section II. However, the inability of the
polynomial specification to ensure a monotonic treatment effect over distance is
a shortcoming of that specification. In addition, the local nature of polynomial
approximations to nonlinear functions means that the error in the predicted
downstream effect is likely to increase as downstream distance increases. For
all of the polynomial orders estimated in Section II, the overall estimated effect
became positive at large distances, a result that is unlikely to be consistent with
the underlying data generating process.
To preclude these non-monotonic effects, I adopt an exponential form for the
pollution process:
f(d) = e−ρd (2.12)
In this specification, downstream pollution (and abatement effects) are assumed
to decay exponentially as distance increases. In addition to solving the non-
monotonicity and positive treatment effects problems that plague the polynomial
model, the exponential pollution process is more parsimonious, requiring just
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a single additional parameter, namely the exponential rate of decay ρ. This
parameter measures the average rate at which pollution decays as it flows
downstream. Estimates of ρ that are large in magnitude indicate that pollution
decays rapidly downstream, implying also that pollution (and treatment) spillovers
have little effect on downstream pollution.
The full spatial model can be expressed as
P = W (ρ)P + βT̂ + τ + ψ + ε (2.13a)
ε = M(λ)ξ (2.13b)
ξ ∼ N(0, σ2Iω)
The spatial weight matrix W (ρ) captures the distance between adjacent monitoring
stations:
W (ρ)i,j =

e−ρdij , if i immediately downstream of j in time t
0, otherwise
(2.14)
The treatment vector T̂ is constructed similarly to equation (2.1), but each treated
station is weighted by the distance between that station and its nearest upstream
STP:
T̂ =

e−ρdsi if station s immediately downstream of STP i,
0 otherwise
(2.15)
The vector ω weights the variance σ2 for each station, which accounts for
station-level heteroskedasticity. This vector is premultiplied by the additional
spatial weight matrix M(λ), which captures the correlation between stations
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located within a certain radius of each other in the geospatial dimension:
M(λ)i,j =

e−λdij , if dij < d
0, otherwise
(2.16)
These additional spatial weights describe shocks that affect pollution levels at
multiple stations which are not (necessarily) located along the same river system.
For instance, regional weather patterns (such as rainfall) may impact pollution
levels at multiple stations across rivers. The maximum distance parameter d
gives M(λ) some zero entries, which increases computational efficiency. In all
specifications, d is set to 500 kilometers.3
Solving for P in equation (2.13a) yields
P = β(I −W (ρ))−1T̂ + τ̃ + ψ̃ + (I −W (ρ))−1M(λ)ξ (2.17)
Expressing the equation as in (2.17) highlights the downstream effects of treatment
and the error process. The matrix (I − W (ρ))−1 can be expressed as the infinite
sum
(I −W (ρ))−1 = I +W (ρ) +W (ρ)2 + . . . (2.18)
By construction, each nonzero entry of the matrix W (ρ) is an exponential function
of the distance between stations i and j, with elements of this matrix given by
w(ρ)ij = e
−ρdij . Entries are nonzero if and only if i is immediately upstream of j;
W (ρ) captures the first-order relationship between stations. Therefore, the elements
of the matrix W (ρ)k capture the (exponentiated) distance relationship between
3The results are not sensitive to the choice of d. The estimated values of λ in various
specifications suggest that the distance-denoominated half-life of nearby pollution shocks is
less than one kilometer. The percentage of the shock that persists to the 500km boundary is
effectively zero.
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stations that are separated by k stations along a river system. For instance, w(ρ)
[2]
ij
(the ij element of matrix W (ρ)2) is nonzero if i and j are separated by one station.
To see this, suppose the intermediate station (between i and j) is indexed by
h. Then w(ρ)ih = e
−ρdih and w(ρ)hj = e
−ρdhj . Then, by pre-multiplying W (ρ) by
itself, the ijth element of the squared matrix W (ρ)2 is
w(ρ)
[2]
ij = e
−ρdihe−ρdhj (2.19)
= e−ρ(dih+dhj) (2.20)
= e−ρdij (2.21)
Rivers are unidirectional; pollution that flows from station i to j must flow
through the intermediate station h as well. The river distance that the pollution
travels is therefore the sum of the intermediate distances. The novel approach
introduced here specifies an exponential function of distance in the weight matrix,
which captures this relationship in an intuitive way.
The infinite sum (I −W (ρ))−1 then captures the exponential of the distance
between each station and all upstream stations.4 By interacting this matrix with
the treatment variable T̂ , the spatial lag model collapses to the the treatment
externality model in (2.4a), but with an exponential treatment variable, T̂site
−ρdi,s :
Pit =
∑
s
βT̂site
−ρdi,s + τt + ψi + εit +
∑
j upstream of i
εjte
−ρdi,j (2.22)
Note the similarities between equation (2.22) and the OLS model of Section II
(equation (2.4a)). The only difference in the non-stochastic portions of these
equations is that the polynomial function of distance in equation (2.4a) is replaced
with an exponential function in equation (2.22).
4There are a finite number of stations along each river in the data. Therefore the matrix
W (ρ)k contains only zeros when k is large, and the sum is finite.
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In contrast to the OLS model of equation (2.4a), the upstream error terms
are included in the spatial model. The externality matrix (I − W (ρ))−1 interacts
with the disturbance term, allowing errors to persist downstream in a similar
manner to the treatment externalities. The heteroskedastic-robust errors estimated
in Section II are unlikely to be accurate in the presence of externalities. In contrast
to a simple clustered-error approach, the externality matrix in equation (2.14)
allows errors to decay exponentially, rather than specifying common covariances
within arbitrarily designated clusters.
Estimating the Spatial Model. The likelihood function for the
spatial model in (2.13a)-(2.14) and sufficient conditions for the existence of a
maximum are given in Anselin (2013). Although it can be shown that these
conditions are met, the presence of the time and station fixed effects and the
heterogeneous error weights give rise to a 1,124-dimensional parameter space.
Estimating the maximum and Fisher information is not computationally feasible
at present.
I instead estimate the spatial model using Bayesian techniques, as outlined
by LeSage and Pace (2009). A Bayesian posterior distribution is simply the
weighted average of prior beliefs and the likelihood function. Rather than relying
on the curvature (the Hessian matrix) at the maximum of the likelihood function
to conduct hypothesis tests, Bayesian techniques can be used to estimate the
entire posterior distribution, which can be used to express confidence in particular
parameter values. Whenever feasible, I employ uniform priors.5 Furthermore,
Bayesian posterior distributions converge to the likelihood function as the sample
size approaches infinity. The posterior distributions reported here are therefore
5I use the term “uniform” to refer to non-informative priors, where equal prior probability is
assigned to each draw.
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close approximations to the traditional likelihood function associated with the
model.
In general, the posterior distribution cannot be found analytically.
Fortunately, various methods exist that allow for samples to be drawn from the
posterior. A large number of samples can then be combined in a Monte-Carlo
simulation of the true posterior distribution. Most sampling methods require
samples to follow sequentially from the previous sample, forming “chains” of
samples. Draws are not independent of each other, and it therefore takes a long
time to cover a majority of the posterior distribution. For this reason, it is common
practice to include a “burn-in period” wherein chains are initiated and samples
are created, but the early samples are then discarded before the Monte-Carlo
integration takes place. This burn-in allows the sampler to move away from the
initial value and toward the mass of the posterior, thereby minimizing the impact
of the initial draws (which are chosen by the researcher). Convergence of the
chains can be analyzed by initializing various chains with heterogeneous starting
values, then comparing the chains to see if they converge to similar regions of the
parameter space.
In this paper I utilize the No-U-Turn sampler of Homan and Gelman (2014).
This sampler is characterized by minimal path dependence and rapid convergence
to the posterior distribution (Neal et al., 2011). Given the large parameter space
and the complexity of the likelihood function, these features are necessary to ensure
convergence.
The parameter space is minimized by drawing each unique element of ω
from an inverse gamma distribution, where the shape and scale hyperparameters
of the inverse gamma are drawn from a uniform distribution before each iteration.
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Uniform priors are assigned for each of the fixed effects. The exponential decay
terms ρ and λ are assigned exponential priors with an inverse-scale parameter of
1. These priors account for the fact that the likelihood function is approximately
uniform for large values of ρ and λ, which correspond to very small externalities.6
The No-U-Turn sampler is implemented using the Stan language (Carpenter
et al., 2015). Column 1 of Table 4 shows the summary statistics for the posterior
distributions. The estimated treatment effect is similar in magnitude to the effect
estimated in the previous section. Following the sampler’s burn-in period, none
of the samples were greater than 0 (in fact, none of the samples were larger than
−0.2). Recalling that the posterior distribution is quantitatively similar to the
likelihood function, it can be concluded with near absolute certainty that the true
treatment effect on measured downstream water pollution is negative and nonzero.
Estimation Results. Posterior summary statistics for the two spatial
parameters are also reported in Table 4. The posterior mean for the estimate of λ
is substantially higher than that of ρ, indicating that regional across-river pollution
spillovers are relatively unimportant when compared to downstream pollution
spillovers within rivers. The mean draw from the posterior of λ corresponds to a
distance-denominated “half-life” for pollution of 0.387 kilometers, which implies
that 95% of pollution disappears across rivers located within about 1.6 kilometers
of each other. Regional shocks appear to influence only those stations that are very
near each other geospatially, for example stations located along different rivers
within the same city.
In contrast, the within-river spillover effect is much more substantial.
The posterior mean of ρ is 0.006, which corresponds to a downstream distance-
6Without specifying these priors, the sampling algorithm tends to get “stuck” in regions with
high draws of the exponential parameters, which delays convergence of the posterior draws.
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Dependent variable:
Log of Fecal Coliforms
(1) (2)
Treatment (β) −0.351 −0.474
[−0.406, −0.298] [−0.402, −0.551]
Post 5-Year Effect (βL) 0.216
[0.144, 0.296]
Long-Run Effect (β + βL) −0.258
[−0.191, −0.324]
Downstream Effect (ρ) 0.006 0.009
[0.005, 0.007] [0.006 0.013]
Regional Effect (λ) 1.850 1.105
[1.097, 2.913] [0.531, 2.022]
Downstream Half-Life 115.1 75.8
[93.6, 140.5] [54.8, 103.7]
Note: Point estimates are posterior means. 95% posterior likelihood in
brackets. All specifications include station and time fixed effects and
have 38,625 observations. Column 1 corresponds to equation (2.17) and
column 2 corresponds to equation (2.23).
Table 4. Bayesian Spatial Estimation Results
denominated half-life for pollution of 115.1 kilometers. Upstream pollution, and
therefore upstream pollution abatement, persists downstream for hundreds of
kilometers. Ninety-five percent of pollution measured at any given location on a
river dissipates after an estimated average of about 500 kilometers downstream.
Figure 7 plots kernel density estimates for some of the of the posterior
parameter distributions (β, rho, and λ) presented in Table 4. Of particular interest
is the noticeable right-skewness in the posterior distribution for λ, the regional
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Figure 7. Bayesian Posterior Distributions
effect. The sampler periodically selects large values which correspond to very small
regional effects. If assigned a uniform prior, the sampler has difficulty converging
to a distribution with a finite mean—the sampler converges only by discounting the
large draws of λ. This suggests that regional spillovers are even less significant than
the point estimates suggest. Pollution shock processes that have a common effect
on stations across rivers appear to have little influence on pollution levels beyond a
few kilometers.
Figure 8 shows the trace plot for the posterior draws. Each line represents
the posterior draws associated with one of the 32 chains that were initiated (burn-
in period included). The rapid convergence of the No-U-Turn sampler is apparent;
37
−0.5
−0.4
−0.3
−0.2
−0.1
0.0
0 100 200 300 400 500
draw
β
0.000
0.025
0.050
0.075
0.100
0 100 200 300 400 500
draw
ρ
0
2
4
6
0 100 200 300 400 500
draw
λ
Figure 8. Bayesian Posterior Draws
for all initial values, the sampler converges to the posterior distribution after only
50 draws. Initial values of the treatment effect β range from −1.937 to 2.003, and
all chains quickly converge to the posterior centered on −0.351. Initial values of
ρ are between 0.150 and 5.992, with all chains converging to the posterior mean
of 0.006 within 50 draws. The estimates are therefore robust to a wide range of
arbitrary initial values, and the rapid convergence of all chains suggests that the
true posterior distribution is being sampled.
The results in Section II suggested that the treatment effect is heterogeneous
across time. This heterogeneity is investigated in the spatial setting by estimating
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the equation
P = W (ρ)P + βT̂ + βLT̂L + τ + ψ + ε, (2.23)
which is the spatial analog of equation (2.3). T̂ is again the treatment variable,
weighted by the downstream distance from the STP. T̂L is similarly defined, but is
equal to zero for the first five years after the date when the sewage treatment plant
is built, as in equation (2.3). β is therefore the treatment effect for just the first five
years after treatment, while β + βL is the long-run effect.
Similar to the results in Section II, the treatment effect is found to be
larger in the first five years after treatment (column 2 of Table 4). The short-run
treatment effect of 0.474 is cut in half after five years, indicating that the sewage
treatment plants, on average, lose about half of their effectiveness after five years of
operation.
In contrast to Section II, the long-run treatment effect (β + βL) remains
negative and significant. The spatial dependencies in the data appear to bias the
long-run OLS estimates toward zero. The richer model that accounts for the spatial
lag shows a significant effect on pollution levels downstream of sewage treatment
plants even after the initial five-year period. Despite evidence of substantially
reduced effectiveness over time, the sewage treatment plants still appear to have
a significant long-run beneficial impact on pollution levels.
Joint Posterior Distributions. The estimates of the spillover
parameter ρ in column 2 of Table 4 remains similar to that of column 1. While the
mean of the posterior shifts substantially, this is mostly due to an increase in the
right-hand tail of the posterior distribution (Figure 9). The sampler’s propensity
to choose larger values of ρ is likely due to the relatively low explanatory power
of the additional treatment variable in equation (2.23). The diminished treatment
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Figure 9. Bayesian Posterior Distributions, Heterogeneous Treatment
effect after five years reduces the amount of systematic right-hand-side variation.
The spatial parameters ρ and λ then must explain more of the variation in
pollution levels. When this is the case, it becomes more difficult to disentangle the
downstream spatial effect (ρ) from the regional spatial effect (λ).
This result can be confirmed visually. Figure 10 shows the joint posterior
distributions of ρ and λ for both treatment specifications. With the single
treatment variable, the joint posterior is more nearly spherical. In contrast, the
additional treatment variable results in a larger negative correlation between the
two spatial parameters. Small draws of λ are associated with large draws of ρ, and
vice versa.
Downstream Treatment Effects. The parameter β represents
the estimated treatment effect measured at a monitoring station immediately
40
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
0.005 0.006 0.007
ρ
λ
(a) Single Treatment Variable
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
0.008 0.010 0.012
ρ
λ
(b) Two Treatment Variables
Figure 10. Joint Posteriors of Spatial Parameters
downstream of an STP (dis = 0). The predicted treatment effects for monitoring
stations further downstream of an STP are a function of β, the exponential decay
parameter ρ, and the downstream distance:
T (β, ρ, d) = βe−ρd (2.24)
This expression can be calculated after each draw of the sampler. Consequently, the
posterior distribution of T (·) can also be analyzed.
Figure 11 shows the 95% posterior likelihood plotted against a monitoring
station’s distance from an upstream STP. The estimated downstream treatment
effect is substantial for downstream monitoring stations. The mean estimated
reduction in fcoli levels 200 kilometers downstream is larger (in magnitude) than
−0.1. Given that nearly all monitoring stations have a another station within 200
kilometers downstream (see Figure 2), failure to account for the downstream effects
can potentially introduce substantial bias.
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Figure 11. 95% Posterior Likelihood of Downstream Effects
Discussion
The estimated effect of STP construction on measured fcoli counts in the
previous sections appears to lie between −0.227 and −1.165. While significantly
different from zero in all specifications, this treatment effect is small in magnitude.
The sample standard deviation of fcoli levels is 2.92, so estimated treatment effects
fall between 13% and 40% of one standard deviation.
However, the magnitude of the estimated treatment effect must be
considered in the context of the existing pollution abatement infrastructure. In
particular, only a small percentage of generated wastewater is treated before it is
returned to the rivers. As of 2012, sewage treatment capacity in major Indian cities
was 31% of generated sewage (Kaur et al., 2012). The remaining 69% was released
untreated into the environment, either in the form of open latrines or municipal
sewage systems that empty directly into a river or lake.
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The hypothetical effect of treating all generated sewage can be extrapolated
using a “back-of-the-envelope” calculation. An estimated 38,554 million liters per
day (MLD) of raw sewage is created in India, of which 11,786 MLD are treated,
according to the Ministry of Environment and Forests (Kaur et al., 2012). The
STPs created under the NRCP had an original capacity of 4,120 MLD. Dividing
the untreated sewage generation by the NRCP capacity and multiplying by the
estimated treatment effects gives the approximate reduction in fcoli that would
result from treating all generated sewage in India. This value is between 2.52 and
7.57. A widespread reduction of 7.57 (the upper estimate) would reduce 98% of the
observed samples to below the EPA threshold for recreational usage.
The potential health benefits are large. Wade et al. (2010) surveyed
recreational water users one week after bathing in water monitored for coliform
bacteria. They find that an increase of fcoli levels of 2.30 doubles the likelihood of
experiencing gastrointestinal illness. The estimated reduction of fcoli levels in India
due to treatment (−0.351) would therefore decrease the likelihood of contracting a
gastrointestinal disease by approximately 15%. Other epidemiological studies find
similar health effects of fcoli reductions (Colford et al., 2005; Colford Jr et al., 2007;
Lee et al., 1997; Wiedenmann et al., 2006).
The risk of contracting a gastrointestinal disease from recreational water
usage with the sample mean fcoli level in the present study is 3.2% (EPA, The
Environmental Protection Agency, 2012).7 The existence of a sewage treatment
plant immediately upstream then reduces this risk to 2.72%. In other words,
bathing in water immediately downstream of an STP, as opposed to bathing in
untreated water, reduces the risk of contracting a gastrointestinal disease by 0.5%.
7This risk is calculated at the EPA’s statistical threshold value, which is approximately the
sample mean in the data.
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This percentage may seem small, but to put this change in perspective, an
estimated 120 million people bath in the Ganga as part of the annual Maha Kumbh
festival (Khaleej Times, 2013). A new sewage treatment plant built upstream of
the festival location would eliminate roughly 600,000 cases of gastrointestinal illness
among festival attendees alone.
In all of the specifications in this analysis, the estimated treatment effects
are larger in the first few years after treatment than they are for later years in
the sample. There are two possible explanations for this result. First, sewage
generation may be increasing over time. Increasing population and urbanization
rates would result in more sewage generation in the areas likely to have acquired
a new STP as part of the NRCP. The already meager capacity of the STPs may
simply be overwhelmed by these migration and population trends. Unfortunately,
no longitudinal data on regional sewage generation in India appear to exist, so this
hypothesis cannot be tested directly. However, demographic trends do not tend to
fluctuate dramatically in the short run. The rapid decrease in STP effectiveness
after the first few years, visible in Figure 5, therefore suggests that migration and
population effects are unlikely to be the driving force.
The second possibility is that the STPs themselves diminish in technological
effectiveness over the sample period. Facilities need continuous physical and human
capital investments to remain fully operational. If these investments are not made,
or if the funding is instead diverted to corrupt officials, then the effectiveness of the
facilities could be greatly diminished. Unfortunately there is no centralized effort
to monitor the effectiveness of the treatment plants. However, episodic government
inspections have been undertaken that largely support this explanation by painting
a dismal picture of the maintenance status of sewage treatment plants in India.
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In 2007, inspectors from the Ministry of Environment and Forests visited
84 of the 236 known STPs. The performance of 46 (55%) of those plants was rated
as “poor” or “very poor” by inspectors, with just 8 (9.5%) being rated as “good”
(Mauskar, 2008). The report specifically highlights a lack of investment as a serious
problem:
Fund shortage is an important factor in poor operation and
maintenance of STPs and has been reported in 26 cases. The problem
of fund shortage is mostly reported from States of Bihar, Haryana, U.P.,
and West Bengal. This trend shows that the root of problem lies in less
priority being given to sewage treatment (page 17).
Human capital shortcomings are also highlighted. STP operation is generally
carried out by private-sector contractors, who “generally depute unqualified or less
qualified staff at site.” In some cases, inspectors arrived on site to find the plants
entirely abandoned with thick vegetation impeding access to essential sections.
A more comprehensive investigation in 2013 tells a similar story (Tyagi,
2013). At that time, 104 STPs built as part of the NRCP were visited by
investigators, and fully 28 (27%) were non-operational or had unsatisfactory
performance. The report identifies three areas for improvement: ensuring
uninterrupted energy supply, providing more-skilled manpower, and regular
maintenance.
Caveats and Directions for Future Research. The estimates
presented here are average treatment effects. There is considerable heterogeneity
in the technologies and capacities of the sewage treatment facilities which is not
captured in any of the specifications. The specific characteristics of each STP
may be possible to describe with a combination of interviews with STP managers,
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analysis of satellite photographs, and data from the Central Pollution Control
Board. This information may allow for heterogeneity analysis with regard to the
specific treatment technologies utilized or operational schemes adopted (i.e. public
versus private management).
Another important source of heterogeneity that is not accounted for in
this study is the hydrological properties of the rivers. The average downstream
effect is described by a parsimonious polynomial specification (Section II) or an
exponential function (Section II). However, a wide variation in downstream effects
likely exists. Broad and slow-moving rivers like the Ganga are likely to carry
pollution downstream at different rates than swift-moving mountain streams.
These differences are policy relevant, as reductions in pollution along rivers with
significant downstream effects will benefit more people than reductions in pollution
on rivers with less downstream effect, ceteris paribus.
As is common with developing countries, high-resolution panels of
demographic and economic variables do not exist for India. This absence may
introduce some omitted variable bias into the results. The fixed effects account
for any heterogeneity that is constant across time or stations, but some regions
may experience demographic or economic changes that are not experienced by
other regions. These changes may in turn impact the operation and management
of sewage treatment facilities.
This research suggests many avenues for future inquiry. If data on the
operation and management of each sewage treatment plant could be obtained, then
it may be possible to compare the effectiveness of various management schemes.
Given the lack of oversight of the STPs built under the NRCP, for instance, it is
possible that STPs run by private contractors may perform poorly when compared
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to publicly operated STPs. Another approach is to to follow along similar lines
as Lipscomb and Mobarak (2015) and analyze the effectiveness of STPs as a
function of distance from the downstream state or district border. Given that the
downstream effects are found to be significant, it is possible that local governments
are less likely to invest in the operation and maintenance of STPs that are closer
to a downstream border and thus will deliver more of their benefits to a different
downstream jurisdiction.
The Ministry of Environment and Forests reports that the NRCP sewage
treatment plants were built in 1995 (Tyagi, 2013). No comprehensive data on the
operational history of these plants is available. It is therefore possible that some
STPs began operating after 1995, the treatment date used in this research. In this
case, the estimated average treatment effect would be biased toward zero. The
operational effectiveness of the STPs can only be observed by their downstream
impact on measured pollution levels. Future research will focus on this STP-level
heterogeneity.
Conclusion
The estimation results in this paper highlight the importance of controlling
for treatment externalities, which are likely to exist in treatment-effect studies
in environmental settings. Failing to account for these spillovers can cause
considerable bias in point estimates and standard errors for key coefficients. The
traditional OLS-based approach can recover unbiased point estimates, but more
attention needs to be devoted to the covariance structure if proper inferences are to
be made.
The model developed in Section II explicitly accounts for spatial spillovers
in both the point estimates and the error structure. The point estimates of this
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model are analytically equivalent to the traditional OLS model with treatment
externalities if the spillover process is exponential (in distance or any other
dimension). The spatial model integrates the same type of spillover process into
the error term as well. Spillovers that can be modeled as exponential processes
are likely to occur in many environmental settings, whenever the spillovers
can be modeled as traveling along distinct paths. Other applications include
transportation, communication or social networks, where the size of the treatment
effect can be expected to diminish exponentially as it propagates across the
network.
The construction of new sewage treatment plants is associated with, on
average, a substantial initial decrease in pollution levels. This finding contradicts
previous research (Greenstone & Hanna, 2014) and conventional wisdom in India.
Treating a larger percentage of generated sewage would have significant health
benefits even in the absence of other institutional changes.
However, the India’s weak institutional setting appears to compromise the
effectiveness of its sewage abatement infrastructure. Additional benefits could be
derived simply by utilizing existing infrastructure to its full capacity. The results
presented here thus point toward to two obvious policy recommendations. First,
greater sewage-treatment capacity should be created along India’s rivers. Second,
more resources should be devoted to the continuing oversight and maintenance of
existing treatment plants.
Both policies would improve environmental quality on their own. But
complementarities between the two policies would create greater benefits—
new sewage treatment plants would further benefit from improved oversight.
If resource constraints are binding, this suggests that short-run policy should
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focus on combating the rapid human capital depreciation and physical capital
depreciation that occurs at existing treatment plants. Contracts could be written
with specific performance goals, with government auditors inspecting facilities at
regular intervals. This low-cost approach may have large effects, provided that the
independent contractors who operate STPs can be properly incentivized.
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CHAPTER III
GEOSPATIAL DISAGGREGATION OF ECONOMIC AND DEMOGRAPHIC
DATA
Introduction
In much of the world, census and survey count data are reported for
predefined geographic areas. These geographic areas usually define (or at least
constrain) the unit of observation in empirical analysis. Heterogeneity within the
geographic region is typically hidden from the researcher.
In this paper, I develop a method to spatially disaggregate count data
recorded over any arbitrary geographic area. The method uses freely available
satellite data to estimate pixel-level counts of the aggregated statistic. The method
is dasymetric in that aggregate counts are preserved in the pixel-level estimates.
Aggregate and mean prediction error is zero by construction.
The method presented here creates estimates of economic and demographic
statistics for small (500m or less) geographic areas. This geographic resolution
is considerably finer than the resolutions typically used in empirical research.
Count statistics aggregated to a administrative boundary might obscure important
heterogeneity within the administrative boundary, or may even be a function of the
administrative boundary itself, as administrative boundaries are often determined
endogenously to many relevant economic outcomes. The method described in
this chapter creates geospatial estimates that can be utilized independently of
predefined administrative boundaries and can be aggregated to any arbitrary
geographic region. For example, a researcher interested in water pollution exposure
can estimate the population or poverty rate within any arbitrary distance to a body
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of water—or even a function of distance—to a body of water. Such a procedure
would allow for robust estimates of treatment intensity.
There is a large literature on the spatial disaggregation of population data.
The earliest attempts involved researchers in hot air balloons or light aircraft
manual counting housing units. More resent and sophisticated examples use
satellite-derived data and statistical techniques to assign population counts to
individual pixels within the target geographic area (Mennis, 2009).
The central challenge to producing accurate disaggregated population
estimates is the choice of a statistical model. The functional relationship between
the satellite-observed spectral qualities of the earth’s surface and population
density is unknown and likely to be characterized by a high degree of nonlinearity
and interaction between observable characteristics. The traditional approach to
overcome this problem is to utilize intermediate raster data created by parametric
processes. These intermediate data layers generally take the form of land-use
classification rasters or open-source geographic databases. Standard parametric
statistical models are then used to allocate aggregate population among these
various land-use categories.1 Other approaches involve using non-parametric
machine-learning algorithms trained on the aggregate region, then using the
estimated model to predict pixel-level population counts (Anderson et al., 2014).
These traditional disaggregation methods create estimates are not
constrained to sum to the aggregate population counts. Schroeder and Van Riper
(2013) utilize an expectation maximization (EM) algorithm that estimates
population level at each pixel, then aggregates the pixel-level estimates to create
a set of population weights for the next iteration of the algorithm. The outcome
1Examples of this approach include Li and Weng (2005), Gaughan et al. (2013), and Azar et al.
(2013)
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of the algorithm is a set of pixel-level weights that dasymetrically disaggregate the
count data to the pixels within any geographic region.
The approach I propose here combines the EM-based estimation of
population weights of Schroeder and Van Riper (2013) with a non-parametric
statistical model of the type described by Anderson et al. (2014). Specifically, I
utilize the random forest algorithm developed by Breiman (2001). The flexibility of
the non-parametric random forest model eliminates the need for intermediate data
layers, and this allows the algorithm to run on minimally processed satellite data.
Avoiding the need for intermediate layers also means that the algorithm performs
similarly on any economic or demographic count data, constrained only by the
satellite-observed spectral qualities of the statistic in question. For example, any
difference in populations that can be readily observed from above, approximately,
by the naked eye—such as population density, construction materials, or urban
development boundaries—should be predicted with similar accuracy by the
algorithm.
The use of satellite data has become increasingly common in economics.2 In
a landmark study, Henderson et al. (2012) show that satellite-observed nighttime
light is highly predictive of aggregate income at the national level. These findings
have been used to motivate studies of everything from comparative development
(Henderson et al., 2018; Michalopoulos & Papaioannou, 2012) to the local effects
of political clientelism (Asher & Novosad, 2017). But despite the well-known
relationship between aggregate output and nighttime light, comparatively little is
known about the relationship between local economic conditions and nighttime
light. For example, Asher and Novosad (2017) use nighttime light data aggregated
2See Donaldson and Storeygard (2016) for a comprehensive review of the use of satellite data
in economic research
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to the electoral district as an outcome variable to show that close electoral
outcomes in India lead to a comparative increase in economic growth relative to
non-competitive districts. However, they are unable to describe how that growth
manifests within the electoral district. Large economic gains accruing to a small
minority of high-income earners are empirically indistinguishable to widespread
increases in economic activity among poorer residents. In one of the illustrated
applications below, I show that combining nighttime light data with disaggregated
population data permits pixel-level estimates of economic activity that are highly
correlated with other economic outcomes.
This paper is organized as follows. Section III details the dasymetric
disaggregation algorithm. The algorithm is demonstrated using data from the
2014 census of Uganda. Next I provide some applications of the algorithm in
the Ugandan context. In section III, I combine pixel-level nighttime light data
with disaggregated population data to create pixel-level estimates of per-capita
economic activity. This strategy allows for assessment of the geographic dispersion
of economic activity and highlights the inadequacy of relying on data aggregated
at the level of the census district to draw inferences about the distribution of
economic activity. Section III demonstrates that the resulting disaggregated count
statistics that are ex ante correlated with poverty are highly correlated with pixel-
level per-capita nighttime light estimates. In section III, I show that disaggregated
census counts can be combined with remotely sensed pollution data to create
more-accurate measure of pollution exposure than were previously available to
researchers. I show that the previously unobserved variation in pollution exposure
within census district has a substantial effect on the overall distribution of pollution
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exposure. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of potential future applications and
possible ways to improve the predictive performance of the algorithm.
Algorithm
Geospatial disaggregation involves the allocation of an aggregate count
statistic, measured over a larger geographic region, to constituent partitions
within the region. In the case of satellite data, these partitions are the component
pixels (defined as the resolution of the raw satellite data) of a geographic region.
Formally, denote Y as the aggregate count statistic measured over some well-
defined spatial region, such as a state, county, or census tract. The geographic
region is composed of K pixels, indexed k = 1, 2, . . . , K. The pixels partition the
geographic space, so the disaggregated contribution of each pixel k to the aggregate
count Y is a fraction of the total count λkY , with
∑K
k=1 λk = 1. For example, if
Y is the aggregate population of some geographic region, λkY is the population
of pixel k within said geographic region. The geospatial disaggregation problem
can therefore be stated in terms of estimating the pixel-level dasymetric weights
λ = (λ1, λ2, . . . , λK).
The vector Xk contains remotely sensed data measured at each pixel k. The
relationship between the pixel weights and the remotely sensed data is modeled as
λkY = f(Xk) + εk (3.1)
where εi is a mean-zero disturbance.
The geospatial disaggregation problem requires joint estimation of f and
λ. I proceed using a two-step procedure, similar to an expectation-maximization
(EM) algorithm. In the first step (the “maximization” step), f̂(Xk) is estimated
for a given λ̂. Next (the “expectation” step), the predicted pixel-level counts ŷk =
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Step 0. Initialization: Randomly select weights λ̂k for each pixel k,
with 0 ≤ λ̂k ≤ 1 and
(∑K
k=1 λ̂k = 1
)
.
Step 1. Estimate λ̂kY = f(Xk) with a random forest.
Step 2. Predict pixel-level counts ŷk = f̂(Xk).
Step 3. Create new weights λ̂k =
ŷk∑K
i=1 ŷi
.
Step 4. Repeat steps 1–3 until convergence.
Figure 12. The Disaggregation Algorithm
f̂(Xk) are used to construct the predicted pixel-level weights λ̂k = ŷk/
∑K
i=1 ŷi. The
procedure is seeded using random weights λ, and repeated until some convergence
criteria (such as reduction in out-of-sample mean squared error) is satisfied.
The expectation step—the creation of weights λ̂—is a necessary step in the
algorithm. Because of this, the algorithm is only able disaggregate count data that
can be expressed as Y =
∑K
k=1 yk, where yk is well-defined on each geographic area
k. Importantly, data that represent rates or averages (such as the unemployment
rate) cannot be disaggregated by the algorithm, as the aggregate average cannot be
expressed as the sum of the constituent pixel averages within the geographic area.
Each iteration of the algorithm produces two relevant values. The estimated
dasymetric weights λ̂ are used to construct the pixel-level dasymetric allocations
λ̂kY . These are estimates of the pixel-level counts of the aggregated statistic, and
automatically have the property
∑K
k=1 λ̂kY = Y . That is, the aggregate prediction
error is constrained to be zero. Prediction error will therefore attenuate pixel-level
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prediction error within the spatial region in question, as the true pixel-level counts
are usually a mean-preserving spread of the predicted counts.
The second output of the algorithm is the raw estimate of the pixel-level
disaggregation ŷk = f̂(Xk). While lacking the property of a zero aggregate error,
these forecasted values can be used for out-of-sample predictions of pixel-level
counts. These estimates can be used for various cross validation methods to assess
the overall performance of the disaggregation algorithm.
The function f transforms the remotely sensed data Xk into a pixel-level
disaggregated count ŷk. The two primary difficulties in estimating f are variable
selection and the functional specification of f(·). In recent years, large quantities
of satellite-derived data are available for most of the earth’s surface. Traditional
dasymetric methods using satellite data rely on intermediate estimates, such as
land-cover classifications. The outputs of these intermediate models (pixel-level
land classification) are then used as inputs in parametric models to explain pixel-
level counts of population.
The parameterizations of the traditional dasymetric methods leave much
to be desired. Intermediate data layers are generally constructed independently,
without regard to the outcome variable of interest. Binary land-cover classifications
(e.g. grassland, developed, or forest) may be useful for disaggregating certain types
of count variables like population or farming. However, they are not constructed
with their value in predicting population estimates in mind, nor is it likely
that they will be useful for disaggregating other types of socioeconomic count
variables. Furthermore, there is little ex ante justification for preferring specific
parameterizations of f . The commonly used method of ordinary least squares, for
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instance, assumes a linear relationship between the variables in the vector Xk and
the dasymetric weights λk.
For the method introduced in this chapter, these problems are addressed
by using a random forest algorithm to estimate f(Xk). The random forest is
nonparametric in the sense that it allows for high-order interactions between
variables as well as an arbitrary degree of nonlinearity. Further, the random
selection of variables at each partition node in the algorithm allows the Xk
variables with highest predictive power to drive results, while simultaneously
discouraging overfitting by disallowing any single variable (or set of variables) from
dominating the construction of each regression tree. The random forest approach
therefore allows the researcher to remain agnostic regarding variable selection and
parameterization.
I demonstrate this new disaggregation algorithm using data from the 2014
census of Uganda. In addition to the typical counts of people and households,
the Ugandan Bureau of Statistics records counts of a variety of socioeconomic
statistics, including the number of households who rely on a tabooda (kerosene
lamp) for light, counts of people who eat two or more meals per day, and the
number of subsistence farms. The smallest geographic area reported by the Bureau
of Statistics is the subcounty. Shapefiles produced by the Bureau of Statistics can
be matched to these count data for 1,441 identified subcounties having an average
area of 168km2.
Three sources of remotely sensed data are exploited for variables to
include as the Xk. The Landsat 8 spacecraft records a variety of spectral radiance
wavelengths (see Table 5) on a 16-day interval at a resolution of 15m or 30m. All
images over the sample area (Uganda) for the year 2014 are combined using a
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“greenest-pixel” composite to create a single raster image of each spectral band
for the year. nighttime light data is recorded by the Visible Infrared Imaging
Radiometer Suite (VIIRS) aboard the Suomi NPP satellite. Monthly average
nighttime light is recorded at a 500m resolution. Annual averages for each pixel are
calculated. Finally, elevation data are derived from the Shuttle Radar Topography
Mission.
Data Spacecraft Spatial Resolution Temporal Resolution
0.43–0.45 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
0.45–0.51 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
0.53–0.59 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
0.64–0.67 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
0.85–0.88 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
1.57–1.65 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
2.11–2.29 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
0.52–0.90 µm reflectance Landsat 8 15m 16 days
1.36–1.38 µm reflectance Landsat 8 15m 16 days
10.60–11.19 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
11.50–12.51 µm reflectance Landsat 8 30m 16 days
nighttime light Suomi NPP 500m 1 month
Elevation STS-99 30m February, 2001
Table 5. Satellite Data Sources
Each of the raster layers are resampled to a 500m resolution, the lowest
resolution available in the raw satellite data. Specifically, Xk for each 500m pixel
k contains information on the mean and variance of each raster layer within each
pixel, for those sources with resolution greater than 500m. All calculations are
performed using the Google Earth Engine platform. The final pixel-level data
matrix X has 824,272 rows (pixels) and 28 columns (the mean and variance of each
explanatory variable described in Table 5).
The algorithm is initialized with a random disaggregation of subcounty
counts. To prevent the algorithm from overfitting on the initial (or any other)
random disaggregation, the algorithm for each subcounty is run jointly with each
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of the bordering subcounties. In other words, f̂(Xk) is estimated on a collection
of neighboring subcounties, but the predicted λ̂ is only retained for the central
subcounty. In addition to avoiding the problem of overfitting, this process also
allows for the assessment of out-of-sample performance of the algorithm. At each
iteration, a random forest model is estimated on the surrounding subcounties,
excluding the central subcounty. The estimated random forest model is then
applied to the Xk variables for the hold-out subcounty, then these constituent
pixel-level predictions are aggregated and compared to the census counts. If
the algorithm is accurate, the deviation of the predicted counts in the hold-out
subcounty to the true census counts for that holdout subcounty should be minimal.
Figure 13 demonstrates the disaggregation algorithm for the city of Kampala
and the surrounding area. The top-left panel shows a sample of the raw satellite
data—specifically, the radiance associated with the spectral colors red, blue, and
green as measured by Landsat 8. Built-up urban areas and (lighter) sparsely
populated green areas (darker) are plainly visible. The top right panel shows
the raw census count data for the subcounties in the same region. The goal is to
disaggregate the choropleth population counts in the top-right panel in a manner
consistent with the spectral properties of the satellite data in the top-left panel.
As described above, the algorithm is executed twice on each individual
subcounty and its surrounding subcounties. The first execution includes the
target subcounty and dasymetrically disaggregates the census population counts.
The second execution of the algorithm excludes the target subcounty from
the estimation procedure, then uses the estimated random forest based on the
surrounding subcounties to predict the pixel-level population in the target
subcounty. The resulting estimation is not dasymetric in that aggregate population
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Figure 13. Population Disaggregation of Kampala, Uganda
counts are not preserved, but the (log) error of the predicted populations can be
used to assess the overall accuracy of the algorithm.
The bottom-left panel of Figure 13 records the squared log error for each
subcounty in the Kampala region along with the mean squared error for the region.
The algorithm converges rapidly as both the mean and the most extreme out-of-
sample errors are essentially stable after 25 iterations.
The bottom-right panel of Figure 13 shows the resulting dasymetric
population disaggregation after 25 iterations. The disaggregated counts appear to
match closely the pattern of development that is observable in the (approximately)
true color image in the top-left panel. Furthermore, the lack of substantial
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cross-border discontinuities in estimated population is strong evidence that the
algorithm is not overfitting, since the estimated f̂(·) for each subcounty is created
independently of the f̂(·) of each neighboring subcounty.
The non-parametric nature of the disaggregation algorithm allows the
method to be applied to any count statistic. I demonstrate this flexibility by
disaggregating census counts of population, tabooda (kerosene lamp) usage,
population consuming two or more meals per day, and subsistence farms. Each
count is disaggregated within all observed subcounties in Uganda.
For each of these four variables, Figure 14 shows the out-of-sample error
for each subcounty, across all observed Ugandan subcounties. The 45° dashed
line represents zero prediction error. The bulk of the out-of-sample errors are
clustered around the 45° line, and none of the census variables indicate systematic
out-of-sample error across any part of the subcounty distribution. Further, the
distribution of out-of-sample errors are similarly distributed around the 45° line for
each of the four variables, indicating that the algorithm performs similarly for each
of the four count statistics.
Inequality
Researchers interested in the distribution of economic activity are highly
constrained by the availability of economic data, particularly in the developing
world. In recent years it has become common to utilize nighttime light data to
estimate economic activity in data-poor environments. While the relationship
between nighttime light and economic activity is well established at the national
level (Henderson et al., 2012), comparatively little is known about the relationship
between nighttime light and more-local economic conditions. Additionally, current
methods do not distinguish between economic activity reflecting productivity
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Figure 14. Out-of-Sample Errors
and economic activity reflecting population. If an increase in nighttime light is
observed over a given region, it is generally unknown whether the increase reflects
an increase in wages or simply an increase in population. In terms of welfare, then,
changes in the effects of light activity are ambiguous.
A common approach to address this problem is to aggregate nighttime
light data to a known geospatial unit, such as those demarcated by a census.
However, this aggregation strategy may mask changes in economic activity that
occur within the geospatial unit. In this section, I demonstrate how the dasymetric
disaggregation procedure described in the previous section can be combined with
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nighttime light data to create higher-resolution estimates of per-capita economic
activity.
Denote the set of n economic agents within a geographic area of interest as
N = {1, 2, . . . , n}. The function L : P(N) → R maps some economic outcome
to any subset of economic agents in N , such as income or reliance on subsistence
farming. (P(N) is the power set of N). If economic outcomes are observable for
each individual agent—L(E) is known for all E ⊂ P(N)—then inequality can be
calculated in a straightforward manner. For instance, Theil’s T index is defined as:
T =
n∑
i=1
L({i})
L(N)
ln
(
L({i})
L̄(N)
)
, (3.2)
where L̄(E) = L(E)/|E| is the average of the economic outcome of interest
across all agents in E ⊆ N .
In most settings, L(·) is observed only over a small subset of P(N). For
census and other spatial data, L(·) is observed over geospatial partitions of the
universe of individual agents. Formally, let D = {D1, D2, . . . , DJ} be a partition
of N such that L(Dj) is observable for all i = 1, 2, . . . , J spatial districts. While
L({i}) is unobserved, the economic outcome for each i is indirectly observed
through i’s membership in Dj ∈ D, for some j. The most common way to visualize
L(Dj) is with a choropleth map, which shows the geospatial partition of N along
with the value of L(Dj) for each partition, typically represented on a color scale.
For example, looking ahead, panel A of Figure 15 shows a choropleth map for
Uganda, where each Dj represents census-defined subcounties and L(Dj) is the
aggregate nighttime light emanating from that subcounty.
A decomposition of equation (3.2) allows aggregate inequality to be
described as:
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T =
|D|∑
j=1
L(Dj)
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(Dj)
L̄(N)
)
+
|D|∑
j=1
L(Dj)
L(N)
Tj (3.3)
where Tj =
∑
i∈Dj
L({i})
L(Dj)
ln
(
L({i})
L̄(Dj)
)
(3.4)
The first term in equation (3.3) is between-district inequality, which can
be calculated directly from choropleth values. However, overall inequality is
also a function of the unobserved second term, which captures within-district
inequality. Inequality calculations based solely only on between-district inequality
can dramatically understate—or even overstate—the true level of inequality by
omitting within-district inequality (equation (3.4)).
Dasymetric disaggregation of the choropleth using the algorithm described
above can provide information about the previously unobserved within-district
inequality of nighttime light. First, partition each district Dj into its component
pixels. Denote this further partition as P j = {P j1 , P
j
2 , . . . , P
j
K}, and note that⋃|D|
j=1 P
j also partitions N . Equation (3.2) can therefore be further decomposed:
T =
|D|∑
j=1
∑
P∈P j
L(P )
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(P )
L̄(Dj)
)
+
|D|∑
j=1
L(Dj)
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(Dj)
L̄(N)
)
+
|D|∑
j=1
∑
P∈P j
L(P )
L(N)
Tp (3.5)
where Tp =
∑
i∈P
L({i})
L(P )
ln
(
L({i})
L̄(P )
)
(3.6)
The first term in equation (3.5) is the within-district, between-pixel
inequality. The second term is the previously described between-district inequality.
The last term is the unobserved within-pixel inequality. In essence, the unobserved
“residual” component of equation (3.3) is decomposed into the observable between-
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pixel inequality term and an unobserved residual (which embeds the term in
equation (3.6)). Note that the unobserved residual approaches zero as |P | → 1
for each P ∈
⋃|D|
j=1 (in the limit, each individual i is uniquely observed), or as
L({i}) → L̄(P ) for each i ∈ P (marginal light output is the same for every agent
within a pixel). In other words, unobserved residual inequality approaches zero as
the pixel resolution increases.
Monthly nighttime-light luminosity is observed at a 500m resolution
beginning in 2012 by the Visible Infrared Imaging Radiometer Suite (VIIRS)
aboard the Suomi National Polar-Orbiting Partnership spacecraft. I calculate
average nighttime light for 2014 for each pixel and combine these data with the
2014 Ugandan census data on population, algorithmically disaggregated to the
same resolution as the VIIRS data. The result is a 500m-resolution estimate of
per-capita nighttime light luminosity for the entire country of Uganda. The implied
aggregate nighttime light at the subcounty level is displayed in panel A of Figure
15.
Defining L(·) as VIIRS nighttime light allows for direct calculation of the
observed components of Theil’s T in equation (3.5). Specifically,
|D|∑
j=1
∑
P∈P j
L(P )
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(P )
L̄(Dj)
)
= 0.2706 (within-subcounty, between-pixel) (3.7)
|D|∑
j=1
L(Dj)
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(Dj)
L̄(N)
)
= 0.4177 (between-subcounty) (3.8)
Of the total observed inequality, 39.3% is caused by (previously unobserved)
within-subcounty inequality, while 60.7% is due to between-subcounty inequality.
A visual representation of between-subcounty and within-subcounty
inequality is displayed in Figure 15. Panel A shows the average per-capita light
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Figure 15. Per-Capita Nighttime Light and Within Subdistrict Inequality
Estimates
per subcounty, ln(L̄(Dj)). Extensive inequality is apparent, primarily in the form
of small, urban subcounties with high average nighttime light and large, rural
subcounties with low average nighttime light.
Panel B of Figure 15 shows the within-subcounty, between-pixel inequality,
ln
(
L̄(Dj)
L̄(N)
)
. In comparison to panel A, within-subcounty inequality is more evenly
distributed across subcounties, as evidenced by the geographic dispersion of light
and dark regions across the country. In comparison, the subcounty-aggregated
nighttime lights in panel A show little geographic variation outside of the main
urban areas. The stylized fact that emerges from Figure 15 is that between-
subcounty inequality is driven by the urban-rural divide, whereas within-subcounty
inequality is a nationwide phenomena.
Figure 16 further investigates the distribution of within-subcounty
inequality. Panel A shows the subcounty Kuznets curve—inequality plotted against
economic activity (in this case, within-subcounty inequality plotted against the
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average per-capita nighttime light). Across subcounty areas, there is a strong
positive relationship between average per-capita economic activity and inequality,
which suggests that Uganda is on the upward-sloping portion of the Kuznets
curve.3 Levels economic development are unevenly distributed within subcounties.
Panel B plots subcounty inequality against the logarithm of population
density (average population per inhabited pixel). The overall relationship is
negative—subcounties with greater population density tend to have lower between-
pixel, within-subcounty inequality. However, caution is required when interpreting
this result. Subcounty boundaries are non-random with respect to population
density. Specifically, urban subcounties tend to have a smaller geographic area
and contain more people. In terms of Theil’s T , the unobserved within-pixel
inequality (equation (3.6)) is likely to be higher in more dense subcounties. So
while between-pixel inequality decreases in population density, the relationship
between population density on overall inequality is ambiguous.
The pixel-level estimates of per-capita nighttime light allow for an analysis
of the geographic distribution of economic activity. Figure 17 shows the location
of each quintile of the per-capita nighttime light distribution within Uganda. For
example, panel A shows the geographic location (in red) of the 20% of Ugandans
that reside in pixels with the lowest per-capita nighttime light. If nighttime light
is taken as a proxy for income, panel A shows the geographic location of the
poorest 20% of Ugandans. Broad spatial patterns emerge from the data. First,
the 20% of all Ugandans located in the lowest-nighttime light pixels are centrally
located, mainly around Lake Kyoga and the south-eastern portion of the country
between Lake Victoria and Kenyan border. Few of the poorest 20% of Ugandans
3The canonical representation of the Kuznets curve posits an “inverved-U” relationship
between inequality and income, with inequality peaking in middle-income regions.
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Figure 16. Estimated Relationship Between Nighttime Light, Density, and
Inequality
are located in population-dense urban pixels. While possibly reflecting the urban
wage premium, it is also possible that within-pixel populations of urban poor
cannot be discerned at the pixel-level. This latter possibility will be taken up again
in the next section.
The most widely dispersed quintile is the top 20% (panel E of Figure
17). In addition to Kampala (at the bottom-center of the map) and other urban
areas the most luminous 20% are heavily represented in rural areas near national
parks, perhaps indicating a high return to tourism in those areas. However, a
large proportion of the top 20% pixels appear to be in sparsely populated rural
areas that do not appear to be regions of significant economic activity. These
areas demonstrate a potential shortcoming of using the nighttime light data as
a proxy for income in sparsely populated areas, as stray light from transient
activity (such as military outposts) can cause the relationship between nighttime
light and economic activity to break down. To account for this possibility, panel
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Figure 17. Estimated Geographic Distribution of Population by Quintile of
Nighttime Light Distribution
F reproduces panel E but omits pixels that are estimated to have fewer than
ten people. The remaining pixels indicate the top 20% of the nighttime light
distribution, omitting pixels with population density lower than 40 people per
square kilometer. Removing these low-density pixels results in a clearer picture
of the geographic distribution of the top 20%, who appear to be located primarily
in urban areas, as expected.
The geographic distribution of income quintiles (as measured by nighttime
light) reveals information on urbanization patterns and the urban wage premium.
Figure 18 reproduces the maps presented in Figure 17 for the Kampala region
(located in the bottom center of the maps in Figure 17. Nearly all of the pixels in
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Kampala urban area (center) consist of Ugandans in the top 20% of the nighttime
light distribution. Pixels in the fourth quintile (60%-80%) are observed in the area
immediately surrounding Kampala. Each step backward through the distribution
pushes the featured set of pixels farther away from the city center in an almost
concentric manner. Regional economic status and the urban wage premium are
roughly monotonic in the distance from the urban center.
Figure 18. Estimated Geographic Distribution of Population by Quintile of
Nighttime Light Distribution, Kampala Region
Poverty
Figure 17 highlights the potential to use the disaggregated per-capita
nighttime light estimates to characterize a large portion of the distribution of
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economic resources. In particular, binary identification of the poorest pixels can
be used to estimate poverty rates across any geographic area.
I identify the geographic distribution of poverty in Uganda by identifying
the poorest 41.7% of the population, as defined by the per-capita nighttime light
estimates. The 41.7% figure was chosen to correspond to the World Bank’s 2016
estimate of the poverty headcount ratio—the proportion of people below the
poverty line—for the country. The resulting spatial distribution of the Ugandan
poor is therefore approximately the combined distributions of the first two panels of
Figure 17. These data can be used to estimate within-subcounty poverty rates by
aggregating population counts among poor pixels at the subcounty level.
Panel A of Figure 19 plots subcounty per-capita nighttime light against
the estimated headcount ratio, defined as the proportion of the subcounty
population living in pixels in the poorest 41.7% of the nighttime light distribution.
The apparent negative relationship suggests that poverty rates are lower in
comparatively high-income subcounties. This contrasts with the inequality results
presented in Figure 15, which indicated that high-income subcounties have lower
inequality. These two findings need not be contradictory—lower variance of the
income distribution is likely to be observed in low-income areas, particularly in
rural areas with high levels of subsistence farms. Areas with higher productivity
may have more opportunities for job specialization, therefore increasing the
variance of the income distribution.
Of particular interest in panel A of Figure 19 is the bunching of subcounties
at each extrema of the headcount range (zero and one). The pattern suggests
censoring, despite the bounded range of the headcount ratio. However, the
headcount ratio is estimated at the pixel-level, whereas the within-pixel headcount
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Figure 19. Subcounty Per-Capita Lights, Estimated Headcount Ratios, and
Population Density
ratio may be heterogeneous. Evidence of systematic heterogeneity in the within-
pixel headcount ratio can be observed by noting that the “censored” observations
at the left-hand extremum (subcounties with a pixel headcount ratio of zero on the
left-hand side of panel A) tend to be high density, urban subcounties. Within-pixel
heterogeneity is likely to be higher in dense urban subcounties where socioeconomic
conditions may vary considerably over short distances and poor inhabitants may be
“free riding” on nighttime light from their wealthier within-pixel neighbors.
A similar pattern emerges at the other extremum of the headcount range
(the right-hand side of panel A). The apparent censoring of subcounties with a
pixel headcount ratio of one also appears to be dominated by subcounties with
high population density. These subcounties are urban areas, but with with low
per-capita nighttime light, and therefore are expected to have greater within-pixel
poverty rates.
Further evidence of the systematic variation in within-pixel heterogeneity
is presented in panel B of Figure 19, which groups subcounties by quintile of
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the population density distribution. The proportion of poor pixels within the
subcounties (the estimated headcount ratio) also increases as population density
increases. But this trend suddenly reverses in the highest-density quintile, which
has the lowest proportion of poor pixels. Taken together, the two panels of Figure
19 suggest that economic outcomes based on pixel-level per-capita nighttime light
estimates are likely to be less accurate in pixels with higher population densities.
The Ugandan census does not directly measure poverty rates. However,
many different count statistics reported by the census are likely to be correlated
with poverty and income. For example, the census counts (1) the number of people
in each subcounty that rely on a tabooda—a type of kerosene lamp—for their
primary source of light. Other recorded counts that are likely correlated with
income are (2) the number of people who consume two or more meals per day and
(3) the number of people who rely on subsistence farming as their primary source of
calories. As described previously, these counts can be dasymetrically disaggregated
using the same algorithm that is used to disaggregate the population counts.
Pixel-level estimates of these three alternative poverty proxies are regressed
against nighttime light to assess the ability of nighttime light to explain differences
in the other economic outcomes across pixels. Regression results are reported
in Table 6. While nighttime light alone is a significant predictor for each of the
alternative poverty proxies in the cross-section of pixels (columns 1, 3, and 5),
very little of the estimated pixel-level variation is explained by nighttime light
alone. Furthermore, the sign on the nighttime light variable is the counter to
the expected sign in models (1) and (5), for the cases of tabooda usage and
subsistence farms. This indicates that nighttime light, by itself, is a poor measure
of economic development at the pixel-level. In much applied research, however,
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Dependent variable:
Tabooda ≥ Two Meals Subsistance Farms
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Nighttime light 1.364∗∗∗ −0.339∗∗∗ 1.123∗∗∗ 0.326∗∗∗ 0.637∗∗∗ −0.430∗∗∗
(0.009) (0.006) (0.005) (0.003) (0.005) (0.001)
Population 1.561∗∗∗ 0.731∗∗∗ 0.978∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0003)
Observations 818,937 818,937 818,937 818,937 818,937 818,937
R2 0.025 0.664 0.070 0.652 0.019 0.925
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. All variables are in natural logs.
Table 6. Luminosity as a Pixel-Level Predictor of Other Census Counts
pixel-level nighttime light is the only outcome variable available. By including
pixel-level population estimates (models 2, 4, and 6), the explained variation in
these alternative poverty measures increases dramatically (note also that the
coefficients on nighttime light have the intuitively correct signs). Nighttime light
and estimated population jointly explain 66% of the variation in tabooda usage,
65% of the variation in population consuming two or more meals per day, and 92%
of the variation in counts of subsistence farms.
Pollution Exposure
As an additional illustrative application, note that advances in atmospheric
science and satellite data analysis have resulted in high-resolution estimates of air
pollution over much of the earth’s surface. These estimates have been used in a
variety of contexts and are particularly valuable in the developing world where on-
the-ground pollution monitoring is scarce.
As is the case with nighttime light data, the traditional approach is to
aggregate the pollution data to some known spatial unit, such as a district or
municipality. Information about the finer geographic distribution of air pollution
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is lost during this aggregation process. Unlike nighttime light, pollution exposure
is not additive—average pollution levels within a given area are not equivalent to
the average pollution exposure experienced by each individual within the area (per-
capita nighttime light, in contrast, is reduced by adding an economically idle person
to a geographic area). But in general, pollution exposure is the variable of interest.
Estimates of average pollution exposure can be recovered from the
dasymetric disaggregation procedure. Estimated pixel-level ambient pollution
levels can be weighted by pixel population estimates to produce estimate average
pollution exposure at the pixel level. For small pixel sizes and pollutants are
uniformly mixing at the local level, these pixel-level estimates are approximately
equivalent to pollution levels experienced by each person within a pixel.
I demonstrate this process by utilizing satellite-derived PM2.5 (airborne
particulate matter smaller than 2.5 µm) estimates from NASA’s Socioeconomic
Data and Applications Center (van Donkelaar et al., 2018). The data consist of
annual average PM2.5 estimates that cover most of the earth’s surface. Each pixel
represents an estimate of the annual average PM2.5 level at each pixel.
Aggregating these data to the Ugandan subcounty, average pollution
levels for the year 2014 are shown in panel A of Figure 20. Nationwide patterns
of pollution exposure are evident, with higher pollution levels in the south and
southwest, and lower pollution levels in the northeast.
These subcounty averages do not contain information on within-subcounty
differences in exposure. To assess the relative importance of within-subcounty
exposure, I again turn to equation (3.5) and define the function L(·) as pollution
exposure. The estimated contributions to overall inequality in pollution exposure
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Figure 20. Estimated Distribution of PM2.5 Exposure
are:
|D|∑
j=1
∑
P∈P j
L(P )
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(P )
L̄(Dj)
)
= 0.1493 (within-subcounty, between-pixel) (3.9)
|D|∑
j=1
L(Dj)
L(N)
ln
(
L̄(Dj)
L̄(N)
)
= 0.5201 (between-subcounty) (3.10)
22% (equation (3.9) divided by the sum of equations (3.9) and (3.10)) of the
observed pixel-level PM2.5 exposure is due to within-subcounty variation in
exposure rates across pixels.
Within-subcounty pollution inequality varies considerably across
subcounties. Returning to Figure 20, panel B plots this variation. Importantly,
within-subcounty inequality in pollution exposure is not highly correlated with
average subcounty exposure (panel A). Applied research that uses subcounty-
level exposure estimates and fails to take into account this variation could lead to
attenuated or otherwise biased causal estimates in models that include per-person
pollution exposure.
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The disaggregated pollution exposure estimates allow for pixel-level
comparisons of environmental quality and economic outcomes. One commonly
discussed comparison is the environmental Kuznets curve, which describes the
relationship between income and environmental quality. Figure 21 shows this
relationship in Uganda, using nighttime light as an income proxy. For clarity,
binned averages of PM2.5—constructed by subdividing the range of pixel-level
nighttime light estimates into 200 equally sized bins—are presented (the raw data
contains 818,937 observations). The classic “inverted-U” Kuznets shape is apparent
in this cross section of data. Average pollution exposure peaks at about the 25th
percentile of the per-capita nighttime light distribution, the income proxy.
Figure 21. PM2.5 Exposure by Per-Capita Nighttime Light
Conclusion
This paper proposes a general method for geospatial disaggregation of
administrative socioeconomic data. The algorithm produces dasymetric maps
that preserve aggregate counts, which eliminates errors in the aggregate. The non-
77
parametric nature of the procedure provides generality that can be leveraged to
disaggregate a wide variety of count statistics in addition to traditional dasymetric
population maps.
I demonstrate the algorithm by disaggregating four separate count statistics
recorded by the Ugandan census of 2014 at the subcounty level. These variables
include population and three alternative proxies for income and poverty—tabooda
usage, people consuming two or more meals per day, and subsistence farms. The
algorithm performs similarly well with each variable, yielding small out-of-sample
errors centered on zero throughout the distribution. The algorithm is estimated
using freely available, high-resolution data with minimal parametric adjustment
beyond atmospheric correction of the raw satellite data.
The methodology proposed here has numerous applications. By combining
the disaggregated population estimates with nighttime light data, estimates of
inequality and poverty rates can be calculated at the pixel-level—a resolution
smaller than what is available through official statistics. Similarly, satellite-derived
pollution levels can be used to estimate pollution exposure at the pixel-level, which
provides a more accurate estimation of annual average exposure at the individual
level.
There are many other possible applications. In environments where
economic data are scarce, census bureaus are often able to count variables that
are correlated with economic outcomes. For example, estimated treatment effects of
rural electrification programs may be expected to vary with respect to pre-existing
electrification rates. If census takers count households with electrification in place,
then disaggregated estimates of the counts may be used to calculate treatment
intensity.
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Finally, the flexibility of the disaggregation algorithm allows for a variety
of remotely sensed data to be utilized. All of the examples presented here were
calculated using three satellite sources: Landsat 8, SRTM, and Suomi NPP. But
many terabytes of satellite data from countless sources are made available each
day in publicly available data sets. It is likely that higher-quality data sources,
or data sources that are expected to have ex ante theoretical relationships with
the outcome variable of interest, can be leveraged to improve the disaggregated
estimates. The flexibility and universality of the estimation procedure are its
greatest strengths.
79
CHAPTER IV
THE EFFECT OF INDIA’S 1996 LOK SABHA ELECTION ON POLLUTION
ABATEMENT AND MONITORING
Introduction
Efficient allocation of scarce environmental resources is particularly
important in regions with low environmental quality. In this paper, I highlight the
inefficient allocation of funds from a large-scale government program in India aimed
at reducing water pollution levels in the Ganges Basin (the Ganga Action Plan,
Phase II). Using the Lok Sabha (parliament) election of 1996, I show that cities
where the margin of victory is small are more likely to receive government funding
for pollution abatement and less likely to have routine water quality measurements
after the election. These findings are consistent with a model of policymakers
exchanging public resources for electoral support in subsequent elections.
River pollution is a serious concern in India. The Ministry of Environment
and Forests estimates that more than two-thirds of the wastewater generated in
India’s cities and towns is discharged directly into waterways without treatment.
As of 2011, the entire nation of India had just 234 sewage treatment plants. By
comparison, the United States has 14,780 plants, despite having one fourth the
population (Mauskar, 2008; The Center for Sustainable Systems, 2015). The
dangerous levels of pollution in India’s waterways constitute a public health
disaster. Hundreds of millions of Indian citizens rely on polluted rivers for drinking
water, bathing, and cleaning. In addition, many rivers are considered holy in
the Hindu faith and are believed to have purifying effects. Each year, millions of
pilgrims ceremonially drink from—and bathe in—dangerously polluted rivers.
80
Policymakers who wish to improve environmental quality in India and across
the developing world are faced with high marginal costs and political economy
constraints (Greenstone & Jack, 2015). Despite billions of dollars in expenditures
since the mid 1980s, the various abatement schemes undertaken by the federal
government of India have had little measurable affect on water pollution levels
(Greenstone & Hanna, 2014). Large-scale wastewater treatment facilities are costly,
but are only capable of treating a small percentage of the total wastewater created
in metropolitan areas. On the political economy front, corruption and earmarking
may lead to inefficient allocations of resources or a lack of information regarding
regulatory compliance and pollution levels (Duflo et al., 2013).
Clientelism, defined as “the proffering of material goods in return for
electoral support” (Stokes, 2011), is commonly observed in India. The social
and economic structure of Indian society is particularly susceptible to clientelist
politics. Dense social networks organized around small groups of individuals (jatis,
or castes), along with a highly hierarchical social structure, create numerous
opportunities for vote-buying (Anderson et al., 2014). Somanathan and Banerjee
(2007) find that politicians with a similar ethnicity as the majority of an electoral
district are more corrupt than “outsider” politicians because they are better
positioned to exploit local social and economic networks. Using a regression
discontinuity design, Lehne et al. (2018) exploit the first-past-the-post nature
of Indian elections to show that public contracts for rural road development
are disproportionately granted to contractors from the same jati as the state
representative for the district.
While most of the literature on clientelism in India focuses on state and
local governments, comparatively little is known about clientelism at the federal
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level. Using a similar regression discontinuity design as Lehne et al. (2018), Asher
and Novosad (2017) find that representation by a member of parliament (MP) from
the ruling coalition is associated with improved economic outcomes, such as firm
profits, employment, and output. The authors suggest that the primary channel by
which politicians are able to influence business outcomes is through regulation.
This paper identifies an alternative mechanism by which clientelist
politicians can influence economic outcomes: the allocation of federal government
expenditures for large-scale public works projects. In the first set of results,
I estimate the effects of electoral outcomes on federal pollution abatement
expenditures as part of the GAP II program. Next, I estimate the effects of
electoral outcomes on the expansion of the nationwide network of water pollution
monitors that is administered by the federal government. I first show that
abatement expenditure is partially determined by the vote-buying behavior of
policymakers during a time of electoral uncertainty. Specifically, I find that cities in
the Ganges Basin are more likely to receive federal funding for pollution abatement
if they are in electorally competitive districts. Second, I show that policymakers
are less likely to monitor water pollution levels in electorally competitive cities.
Given that access to environmental information increases demand for environmental
quality (Jalan & Somanathan, 2008), policymakers avoid reporting on the
effectiveness of abatement schemes because they know that the high marginal cost
of environmental quality means marginal investments will have little measurable
effect on actual pollution levels.
The existing research most closely related to the present work is that of Cole
(2009). Using a similar identification strategy, they find that agricultural credit
offered by state banks increases during election years in districts that are electorally
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competitive. They do not find evidence that similar increases occur in non-election
years nor among private banks, indicating that direct manipulation of financial
services by politicians is likely to be responsible for the increase. Importantly,
they find no simultaneous increase in agricultural output among the electorally
competitive districts. The clientelist targeting of electorally important districts is
therefore (weakly) inefficient.
To preview the main results, I find that cities in contested electoral districts,
where the difference in vote share between the ruling coalition and the opposition
coalition is less than 3%, are on average between 7.0% (5.4%) and 17% (7.6%)
more likely to receive funding as part of Phase II of the Ganga Action Plan
(GAP II), a federal program aimed at reducing water pollution in the Ganges
and its tributaries. The same cities are 2.5% (0.7%) less likely to be monitored
by downstream water pollution monitoring when compared to cities that are not
electorally competitive.
The paper is organized as follows. In section IV I describe the institutional
setting in which this study takes place. Section IV I describe the data used in the
empirical analysis. The main results are separated into two sections. I first describe
the effect of close electoral outcomes on the receipt of federal abatement funding
(section IV). Then in section IV I address the effects of close electoral outcomes
on water pollution monitoring. The final section summarizes the main results and
discusses the policy implications.
Background
Federal administration of Phase II of the Ganga Action Plan (GAP II)
began in 1996 when a variety of state and federal programs were consolidated under
the auspices of the National River Conservation Directorate. States apply to the
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federal government for abatement projects, which may include the construction
of wastewater treatment facilities, riverfront development, or the provisioning of
low-cost toilets to prevent open defecation along river banks. No official guidelines
for project approval appear to exist. Projects and funding allocations are highly
discretionary.
GAP II abatement projects were approved in 99 cities and towns in seven
states within the Ganges basin.1 Figure 22 shows the geographic distribution of
cities receiving GAP II funding, among all cities and towns in the Ganges Basin
identified by the 2001 Census of India.
Little oversight is provided after projects are approved and funds are
allocated. A 2007 survey of sewage treatment facilities constructed with GAP
II funding by the Ministry of Environment and Forests found that more than
half of the plants were rated as “poor” or “very poor” by inspectors, with
only 10% of these plants being rated in “good” condition. Anecdotal reports
from inspectors document many instances where local vegetation had begun to
reclaim the treatment facilities (Mauskar, 2008). Kapur (2020) attributes such
examples to India’s “precocious democracy.” Social cleavages and the relative
political strength of state governments make it difficult for the federal government
to provide sustained funding for small, ongoing projects. As a result, federal
policymakers tend to favor large scale, highly visible programs, such as the one-time
infrastructure improvements provided by GAP II.
The timing of the GAP II program coincides with a period of political
upheaval in India. The historical dominance of the Indian National Congress
party (often referred to simply as “Congress”) had begun to diminish in the late
1The seven states with approved GAP II projects in the Ganges Basin are Bihar, Delhi,
Haryana, Jharkhand, Uttarakhand, Uttar Pradesh, and West Bengal.
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Notes: All cities and towns (defined as population greater than 5,000) from the
1991 Census of India included. Location is derived from the Wikipedia entry for
each city. Ganga Action Plan, Phase II (GAP II) funding status obtained from
India’s Minestry of Environment and Forests.
Figure 22. Electoral Districts and Cities of the Ganges Basin
1980s, giving rise to the “third electoral system” of India (Y. Yadav, 1999). While
individual jatis have always voted more or less monolithically, the third electoral
system is characterized by voting patterns organized around large groups of jatis,
often centered around social status. Caste identity became the dominant feature of
Indian politics during this time (Munshi, 2019). From this system, the Bharatiya
Janata Party (BJP)—a Hindu nationalist party to the political right of Congress—
began to challenge Congress’s dominance at the federal level. The general election
of 1996 was the culmination of these trends. The BJP won the most seats in the
Lok Sabha (parliament), but no party was able to gain a clear majority. A short-
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lived government was formed by the BJP, but was quickly replaced, just 13 days
later, by a ruling coalition consisting of Congress and a collection of left-wing
parties (see Table 7 the post-election organization of the major political parties).
The new electoral reality and the hung parliament created an expectation of
imminent new elections and political uncertainty.
Ruling coalition Opposition coalition Unaffiliated parties
India National Congress Samata Party Bahujan Samaj Party
Janata Dal Bharatiya Janata Party All India Indira Congress (Tiwari)
Samajwadi Party Haryana Vikas Party Jharkhand Mukti Morcha
Communist Party of India
Revolutionary Socialist Party
All India Forward Bloc
Table 7. Coalitions of the 11th Lok Sabha
These expectations manifested in the form of three subsequent elections and
the formation of five separate governments formed within the following three years.
The “third electoral system”, which featured expanded voter participation among
the lower castes (Y. Yadav, 1999), created a high degree of electoral volatility,
with Lok Sabha seats changing hands with a frequency never before seen in India
(Y. Yadav, 1999). This setting created many opportunities and incentives for vote-
buying, as the ruling coalition (see table 7) could reasonably expect to lose closely-
won seats and win closely-lost seats in subsequent elections.
Figure 25 shows the margin of victory between the two main coalitions
that were created following the 1996 elections. Competitive electoral districts
(the darker-shaded regions) are widely distributed across the Ganges Basin, with
the exception of the Ganges Delta (at the bottom right of Figure 25), which is
dominated by Congress and affiliated parties. The central thesis of this paper is
that policymakers targeted the darker regions of Figure 25 (regions with close
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elections) for GAP II funding, primarily for political reasons, rather than for
reasons directly related to pollution levels.
Notes: Darker areas correspond to closer elections. Margin of victory defined as
the absolute value of the difference in vote share between the ruling coalition (post
election) and the main opposition coalition.
Figure 23. Winning Coalition Margin of Victory by Electoral District, 1996 Lok
Sabha Elections
Data
Summary statistics for all variables used in the analysis are reported in
Table 8. The main explanatory variable is the margin of victory between the two
major coalitions. This is the (absolute value of the) difference in the percentage of
votes earned by the leading candidate from the ruling coalition and the percentage
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of votes earned by the leading candidate from the opposition coalition within each
parliamentary district. The main outcome variables are the GAP II indicator
(equal to one if a city received funding from Phase II of the Ganga action plan)
and the monitoring station indicator(s) (which are equal one if a new pollution
monitoring station is opened downstream of a city within three years of the
election). Control variables include city population, distance from the city to a
major river, and city nighttime light luminosity (an income proxy).
Statistic Mean St. Dev. Min Max
1[GAP II] 0.182 0.386 0 1
1[GAP I] 0.010 0.097 0 1
Ruling coalition share 31.229 10.711 8.229 65.981
Opposition coalition share 34.985 10.254 6.215 57.001
Vote margin 12.184 9.963 0.296 49.522
1[New monitoring station within 10km, 1996-1998] 0.019 0.137] 0 1
1[New monitoring station within 20km, 1996-1998] 0.033 0.180 0 1
1[Existing monitoring station within 10km, 1995] 0.136 0.343 0 1
1[Existing monitoring station within 20km, 1995] 0.336 0.473 0 1
Population (log) 9.965 0.978 6.886 13.771
Distance to Ganges/major tributary 0.663 0.644 0.001 2.854
Per capita luminosity 3.010 1.711 −9.460 6.810
Luminosity growth rate, 1992–1999 0.428 1.156 −1.514 11.325
Notes: Each variable has 631 observations. Unit of observation is a city within the Ganges
Basin. GAP variables are indicators equal to one if a city received funding as part of Phase
I or Phase II. Ruling (opposition) share is the percentage of the vote earned by highest
vote-getting party in the ruling (opposition) Lok Sabha coalition. Electoral margin is the
difference in vote share between a party in the ruling coalition of the 1996 Lok Sabha
and the vote share of a party in the main opposition coalition. The major tributaries
to the Ganges are the Alaknanda, Atrai, Ghaghara, Gomti, Koshi, Mandakini, Punpun,
Ramganga, Son, Varuna, Yamuna, and Hooghly. Luminosity is the sum total of all recorded
luminosity within a circle with a 10km radius from the city. Per-capita luminosity is defined
as the inverse hyperbolic sine of raw luminosity divided by city population. Luminosity
growth is the inverse hyperbolic sine of the ratio of luminosity in 1999 to luminosity in
1992.
Table 8. Summary Statistics
The unit of observation for all empirical specifications is a city or town in
the Ganges Basin. The boundaries of the Ganges watershed were determined from
a drainage direction raster calculated from a digital elevation model obtained from
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the HydroSHEDS database (Lehner, Verdin, and Jarvis 2008). Cities and towns
within India (and their populations) were obtained from the 1991 Census of India.
The geographical coordinates of each city and town were derived algorithmically by
scraping the Wikipedia article for each city. These coordinates were then matched
to the Ganges watershed boundaries, creating a dataset of cities and towns within
the Ganges Basin.
Centerlines for the Ganges and its major tributaries (see the Table 8 notes)
were obtained from OpenStreetMaps (OpenStreetMap contributors, 2017). The
distance from each city to the Ganges or one of its major tributaries was calculated
as the great circle distance from the city coordinates to the closest river centerline.
Nighttime light luminosity is used as a proxy for city income (Henderson
et al., 2012). Luminosity is measured by the Operational Linescan System
instruments aboard the spacecraft in the Defense Meteorological Satellite Program.
For income levels, I calculate the inverse hyperbolic sine of the aggregate annual
nighttime light activity within a 10km radius of the city coordinates for the year
prior to the election (1995). As a proxy for income growth I calculate the inverse
hyperbolic sine of the ratio of luminosity in the year 1999 to the year 1992.2
A list of cities that received funding from Phase I and Phase II of the Ganga
Action Plan was obtained from the Ministry of Environment and Forests (see
Figure 22). Electoral results and parliamentary district boundaries were obtained
from the Electoral Commission of India.
Finally, the locations and operational dates for the water pollution
monitoring network were obtained from India’s Central Water Commission and
the Central Pollution Control Board. Figure 24 shows the locations of the pollution
2Inverse hyperbolic sine is used instead of the natural log in order to include cities with no
measured nighttime light luminosity.
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monitoring stations within the Ganges Basin. The drainage direction raster was
then used to match each city with all the associated downstream monitoring
stations.
Notes: Includes all cities and towns (defined as population greater than 5,000) from
the 1991 Census of India included. Location is derived from the Wikipedia entry
for each city. Monitoring station location provided by India’s Central Pollution
Control Board.
Figure 24. Cities with Pollution Monitors
Close Elections and GAP II Funding
The period of political uncertainty following the Lok Sabha election of 1996
created unique incentives for policymakers which coincided with the roll-out of
the Ganga Action Plan, Phase II (GAP II) program. Government expenditures
90
on the program exceeded Rs. 693 billion ($9 billion USD). In this section, I assess
the relationship between these expenditures and the electoral results of the 1996
election. Specifically, I test the hypothesis that cities in electoral districts with a
high degree of electoral competition have a higher likelihood of receiving GAP II
funding than cities in non-competitive districts, ceteris paribus.
The empirical relationship between close electoral outcomes in the Lok
Sabha election of 1996 and a city’s inclusion in the Phase II of the Ganga Action
Plan (GAP II) is modeled as:
Y ∗ips = β · 1[margini < M̄ ] +X ′iγ + πp + σs + εips (4.1)
On the righthand side of equation (4.1), the primary variable of interest is
1[margini < M̄ ], which is a indicator equal to one if the electoral margin of victory
in city i is less than M̄ . The electoral margin is defined as the difference between
the proportion of ballots cast for a candidate from the ruling coalition and those
cast for a candidate in the main opposition coalition, conditional on a candidate
in either of the two coalitions winning the election in that district. Districts where
neither of the two main coalitions are included in all regressions to help identify γ,
the coefficients associated with the control variables). Intuitively, the indicator is
equal to one if the district in which the city lies is electorally competitive from the
perspective of both of the major coalitions. City-level controls are captured in the
vector Xi. The parameters πp and σs are political party and state level fixed effects,
respectively. The city-specific disturbance εips is mean zero.
The latent outcome variable Y ∗ is manifested in the form of the observable
outcome variable Yips:
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Yips =

1 if Y ∗ips > 0
0 otherwise
(4.2)
In this section, the outcome Yips is an indicator equal to one if city i in state
s represented by a member of parliament from party p received GAP II funding.
For the main results, the model is estimated with a probit link function and by
setting M̄ = 3% (elections are considered “close” if the margin of victory is less
than 3%).3 The value M̄ = 3 is selected to balance the definition of electoral
closeness against the number of “treated” cities.
Estimates of the average marginal effects are reported in Table 9. The
baseline Model 1 is the most parsimonious, formed by restricting to zero all right-
hand side parameters other than β in equation (4.1). Cities in parliamentary
districts in where the 1996 election was close (having less than a 3% margin of
victory) are estimated to be 9.8% more likely, on average, to receive GAP II
funding.
The primary identification assumption is the zero mean of the error εips,
conditional on the explanatory variables. The probit estimate of β is biased
if the distribution of districts with close elections is nonrandom with respect
to unobserved city-level characteristics that affect a city’s GAP II status. For
instance, it is reasonable to expect that the electoral composition of a city may
be correlated with income, environmental preferences, and existing abatement
infrastructure.
Potential sources of this omitted variable bias are addressed in Models 2–
5. City-level controls (Xi) include population, an indicator variable equal to one if
3Logit and linear probability model specifications are reported in Table A.15 on page 109.
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Dependent variable:
1[GAP II city]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1[Electoral margin < 3%] 0.098∗∗ 0.103∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.112∗∗∗ 0.132∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.043) (0.047) (0.043) (0.049)
Population (log) 0.066∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.065∗∗ 0.060∗∗
(0.038) (0.025) (0.033) (0.028)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.066∗∗ 0.082∗∗ 0.073∗∗ 0.090∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.100∗∗∗ 0.097∗∗∗ 0.081∗∗ 0.125∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.027) (0.032) (0.034)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.025 0.016 0.020 0.015
(0.033) (0.023) (0.031) (0.026)
Luminosity growth rate 0.023∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗ 0.016∗∗
(0.009) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
1[GAP I city] 0.893∗∗∗ 0.870∗∗∗ 0.881∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Point estimates correspond to probit average marginal
effects. Standard error of average marginal effect in parentheses. Dependent variable indicates
if a city received funding from the GAP II program. Independent variables are described in
the Table 8 notes on page 88. All regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table 9. The Effect of Close Elections on GAP II Funding
a city is within 20km of the Ganges or a major tributary, the level and growth of
income (using nighttime light proxies), and GAP I funding status. The inclusion
of these variables (Model 2) results in a larger and more significant estimate of
the marginal effect of close elections. For the estimated positive coefficient on
the indicator for close elections to be the result of unobserved omitted variable
bias, the omitted variable(s) must be substantially more correlated with electoral
outcomes than the observed control variables included in Model 2. This appears
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unlikely given the relatively small effect that the observed variables in Xi have on
the estimate of β.
Model 3 adds winning-party fixed effects, πp. These fixed effects account
for any unobserved heterogeneity across cities that vote for the same party. This
accounts for the possibility of systematic differences based on electoral preferences.
For instance, while the BJP garners considerable support in Uttar Pradesh, West
Bengal is dominated by their political opponents from the Congress party. The
cultural and religious foundations of these electoral preferences may also impact
demand for abatement expenditures, but the fixed effects may account for these
differences.
Model 4 adds state fixed effects to the specification (σs). These account for
any state and federal complementarities (or rivalries) that are common in India
due to the political ascendance of state governments. Once again, the estimated
coefficient for the within-state effect of close elections is qualitatively similar to the
other estimates, as is the estimate reported in Model 5 which includes both state
and winning-party fixed effects.
Next, I assess whether GAP II status is contingent on electoral results.
The clientelism exhibited by the Lok Sabha may be a reward (or punishment) for
previous voting behavior, or it may be a process akin to vote-buying wherein the
ruling coalition targets electoral districts in order to change future voting behavior.
Empirically, this distinction can be addressed by examining the symmetry of the
close election variable using a modification of equation (4.1):
Y ∗ips =β · 1[margini < M̄ ] + β̃ · 1[margini < M̄ ] · 1[ruling coalition victoryi]+
X ′iγ + πp + σs + εips (4.3)
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The additional parameter β̃ captures the difference between GAP II funding
probabilities in districts where the ruling coalition narrowly lost the election versus
the districts where the ruling coalition narrowly won. A value β̃ > 0 is consistent
with districts being rewarded for their previous voting behavior, whereas β̃ = 0
indicates that policymakers are clientelistically forward-looking.
Table 10 shows the probit estimation results for equation (4.3). The
estimate for the added coefficient β̃ (second row) is statistically indistinguishable
from zero across all specifications. Furthermore, the estimates for β (first row)
are similar to their analogs in Table 9. These estimates are therefore consistent
with forward-looking policymakers who are anticipating frequent elections and the
resulting high level of government uncertainty following the 1996 election. In other
words, the estimates suggest that it is electoral competition, rather than specific
electoral outcomes, that are more directly responsible for the systematic differences
in GAP II allocations across cities.
The parameter M̄ in equations (4.1) and (4.3) determine the closeness
of the election. Identification of β (the main parameter of interest) requires M̄
to be chosen such that error term εips is uncorrelated with the binary variable
1[margini < M̄ ], which summarizes the closeness of the election. This
assumption is unlikely to hold. To assess the importance of this assumption to
the empirical results, estimation of the regression equation (4.1) is repeated for
M̄ ∈ {1%, 2%, . . . , 9%}. Ex ante, the point estimate of β is expected to decreases
monotonically toward zero as the indicator for close electoral outcomes becomes less
restrictive. Figure 25 confirms this hypothesis. Cities in electoral districts where
the margin between major coalitions is less than 9% are no more likely to receive
GAP II funding on average. But decreasing M̄ to 1% increases the estimated effect
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Dependent variable:
1[GAP II city]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1[Electoral margin < 3%] 0.070 0.119∗ 0.112∗ 0.149∗ 0.098
(0.054) (0.064) (0.067) (0.079) (0.072)
1[Margin < 3%] × 0.037 −0.017 0.034 −0.034 0.066
1[Ruling coalition victory] (0.066) (0.048) (0.073) (0.048) (0.091)
Population (log) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.061∗∗
(0.017) (0.025) (0.022) (0.030)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.065∗ 0.084∗∗ 0.071∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.033) (0.031) (0.035)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.103∗∗∗ 0.093∗∗∗ 0.085∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗
(0.031) (0.027) (0.029) (0.036)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.025∗ 0.016 0.017 0.016
(0.013) (0.023) (0.021) (0.029)
Luminosity growth rate 0.023∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗ 0.022∗∗ 0.017∗∗
(0.011) (0.007) (0.009) (0.008)
1[GAP I city] 0.893 0.871∗∗∗ 0.886∗∗∗ 0.868∗∗∗
(1.431) (0.018) (0.014) (0.017)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Point estimates correspond to probit average marginal
effects. Standard error of average marginal effect in parentheses. Dependent variable
indicates if a city received funding from the GAP II program. Ruling coalition victory is an
indicator equal to one if the winning party is a member of the ruling party coalition. Other
independent variables are described in Table 8 notes on page 88. All regressions have n = 631
observations.
Table 10. The Effect of Close Elections and Electoral Victory on GAP II Funding
to 22.4%. However, decreasing M̄ is associated with an increase in the standard
error of the estimate as the number of cities coded as electorally competitive
shrinks. The M̄ = 3 specification offers a good balance between standard errors
and electoral competition, and therefore is the preferred specification.
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Notes: Each point in the top panel represents the coefficient estimates for the
indicator variable 1[Electoral margin < M̄%]. The number of treated cities
(bottom panel) is the total number of observations for which the electoral margin is
less than M̄% for each electoral margin. There are 631 total observations. All other
variables are the same as in Model 4 from Table 9.
Figure 25. Estimated Marginal Effects for Various Electoral Margins of Victory
The coefficient estimates in Figure 25 also mitigate concerns regarding
omitted variable bias. Identification of β requires that the conditional probability
of receiving GAP II funding is the same (on average) for all cities in the sample,
except for differences in electoral outcomes. Any unobserved omitted variable that
is correlated with both electoral outcomes and GAP II funding would threaten
this identification. For instance, it is perhaps unreasonable to believe that cities in
electoral districts that are highly supportive of the ruling coalition are conditionally
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similar to those with more pluralistic politics. But the unobserved differences
between highly competitive electoral districts and slightly less competitive electoral
districts is unlikely to be as much of a concern. Figure 25 indicates that substantial
differences in likelihood of receiving GAP II funding exist between cities with
electoral margins less than 3% and cities with electoral margins greater than 3%.
Both groups of cities contain diverse political preferences and are unlikely to differ
systematically across unobserved characteristics.
Despite this evidence, it is empirically impossible to rule out the possibility
that cities with competitive elections are more likely to receive GAP II funding for
reasons unrelated to clientelism. However, if clientelism were not the cause of the
increased likelihood of GAP II funding in electorally competitive cities, this result
should hold in all cities that are electorally competitive regardless of whether a
party in the ruling coalition is competitive in those districts.
In Table 11, the treatment variable is modified to estimate the effect of close
elections on the probability of receiving GAP II funding among cities in districts
that are not contested by a party in the ruling coalition. These are cities with a
high degree of political pluralism, but they lack the same incentive for vote-buying
by the ruling coalition. Models 1 and 2 (specifications with and without winning
party fixed effects, respectively) show that cities with close electoral outcomes
which are not contested by the ruling coalition are statistically indistinguishable
from cities without close elections. Increased probability of GAP II funding is not
the result of close elections per se, but rather of close elections that are contested
by the ruling party.
Among cities that are contested by the ruling coalition, the mean vote
share for the ruling coalition is 33%. If the composition of the electorate, rather
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Dependent variable:
1[GAP II city]
(1) (2) (3) (4)
1[Electoral margin < 3%]×1[non-competitive] −0.104 0.033
(0.091) (6.953)
Ruling coalition share between 30%–36% −0.063∗∗ −0.067∗∗
(0.031) (0.030)
Opposition coalition share between 30%–36% −0.067∗∗∗ −0.077∗∗∗
(0.026) (0.026)
Population (log) 0.068∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗ 0.062∗∗∗ 0.057∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.017) (0.019) (0.017)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.050 0.082∗∗ 0.062∗ 0.089∗∗
(0.035) (0.038) (0.035) (0.039)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.089∗∗ 0.122∗∗∗ 0.083∗∗ 0.113∗∗∗
(0.036) (0.042) (0.036) (0.043)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.026∗ 0.024 0.020 0.015
(0.016) (0.015) (0.016) (0.014)
Luminosity growth rate 0.025∗∗ 0.022∗ 0.026∗∗ 0.022∗
(0.011) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
1[GAP I city] 0.880∗∗∗ 0.859 0.882∗∗∗ 0.867∗
(0.317) (0.667) (0.321) (0.490)
State FE Yes Yes Yes Yes
Winning Party FE No Yes No Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates correspond to probit average marginal effects.
Standard error of average marginal effect in parentheses. Dependent variable indicates if a city
received funding from the GAP II program. Electoral margin is the difference in vote share
between a party in the ruling coalition of the 1996 Lok Sabha and the vote share of the main
opposition coalition. Cities are ”non-competitive” if neither the ruling nor opposition coalition
wins a seat in the election. The sample mean of coalition vote share among competitive cities is
approximately 33%. Other independent variables are described in the Table 8 notes on page 88.
All regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table 11. The Effect of Vote Share on GAP II Allocations in Non-Competitive
Cities
than clientelism, is driving the differences in funding, one would expect to observe
an increased probability of GAP II funding in cities that have similar shares
of voters supporting one of the two major coalitions, regardless of whether the
election is close. This hypothesis is tested in Models 3 and 4 of Table 11. The
main explanatory variables are indicators equal to one if the vote shares of the
ruling and opposition coalition are within 3% of the mean vote share among
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electorally competitive cities (30%–36%). In terms of the electorate, these cities
are compositionally similar to the cities with close elections, but they are not
themselves electorally competitive. The estimates of the average marginal effect
are negative for both indicator variables across both specifications. If anything,
these results suggest that the differences in electoral composition across competitive
and non-competitive cities is biasing the results toward zero.
The GAP II program was preceded by Phase I of the Ganges Action Plan
(GAP I), in 1985. Though smaller in scope, the objectives and implementation of
GAP I were similar in most respects to GAP II. However, GAP I was implemented
during a time that was not characterized by political instability. GAP I allocations
therefore offer a placebo test for the main results. The 1996 electoral outcomes
should not have an effect on GAP I funding as there was less of an incentive for
vote buying during this earlier period of relative stability. If, instead, the electoral
results of 1996 are predictive of GAP I funding, this would be strong evidence
against the clientelism explanation as political instability should not be predictive
of clientelist policies in the time before the instability occurs.
Table 12 estimates equation (4.1) but replaces the outcome variable Yips
with an indicator equal to one if city i received GAP I funding in 1985, eleven
years prior to the political uncertainty following the 1996 election. The estimate
of the average marginal effect of a close election is statistically indistinguishable
from zero across all specifications. If there are any unobserved characteristics that
determine both the electoral composition (the relative fraction of voters supporting
each major coalition) of a city and the probability of receiving federal funds for
pollution abatement, those characteristics were not present ten years prior to the
sample period.
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Dependent variable:
1[GAP I city]
(1) (2) (3)
1[Electoral margin < 3%] 0.014 0.013 0.006
(0.014) (0.009) (0.004)
Population (log) 0.012∗∗∗ 0.023∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.020∗∗∗ 0.111
(0.006) (0.535)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.003 −0.053
(0.002) (0.292)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 −0.003∗∗∗ 0.001
(0.001) (0.004)
Luminosity growth rate 0.002∗∗∗ 0.010
(0.001) (0.013)
State FE No No Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Point estimates correspond to probit
average marginal effects. Standard error of average marginal effect in
parentheses. Dependent variable indicates if a city received funding from the
GAP I program. Phase I allocations were completed before the election of
1996. Independent variables are described in the Table 8 notes on page 88. All
regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table 12. Placebo Test: The Effect of Close Elections Allocations Prior to the
Election (GAP I)
Monitoring Stations
India’s Central Pollution Control Board maintains a network of water
quality monitoring stations (WQMS) across the country. Those monitoring stations
are located along rivers and streams where periodic (monthly or quarterly) water
samples are drawn and sent to laboratories for analysis. Most of the available
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information regarding water quality in the Ganges Basin is derived from these
monitoring stations.4
The WQMS network is geographically sparse. At the time of the 1996 Lok
Sabha election, the average distance between each city in the Ganges Basin to its
nearest downstream WQMS was 49.9 kilometers. As a result, both the level and
trend in water quality in most cities is undetectable, as are the effects of abatement
measures implemented at the city level.
Water pollution monitoring is relatively inexpensive, compared to abatement
technologies. A rowboat and access to a river is typically all that is required to
add a marginal monitoring location to the network. The marginal value of adding
a specific location to the network is much harder to assess, however, and could
therefore be subject to political manipulation. A ruling coalition concerned about
its tenuous hold on the reins of government may be reluctant to increase pollution
monitoring when pollution levels and marginal abatement costs are high, or when
the marginal decrease in pollution levels that results from abatement is low. The
high pollution levels in the Ganges were highly publicized in the press during
the sample period, so policymakers may have been reluctant to add information
pertaining to the scale of the environmental catastrophe given their inability to
combat rising pollution levels.
I test the hypothesis that policymakers are unlikely to increase pollution
monitoring in electorally competitive districts by estimating equation (4.1) with the
outcome variable Yips set equal to one if a new WQMS opens downstream of city i
within three years of the 1996 election. GAP II status—the outcome variable from
4See Chapter 2 for more information regarding the pollution monitoring network.
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the previous section—can now be included as a (potentially endogenous) control
variable.
The estimated average marginal effects are reported in Table 13. Panel A
defines the outcome variable as equal to one if a new WQMS is constructed within
10km downstream, though this distance is discretionary. For robustness, panel B
considers new monitoring stations withing 20km downstream.
The estimated average marginal effect of close elections on the addition of
a WQMS downstream of a city is negative and statistically significant across all
specifications. Water pollution monitoring is less likely to occur downstream of
cities that are likely to be electorally competitive in subsequent elections. The
evidence in favor of politically endogenous placement of new monitoring stations
is strengthened by the negative and significant estimated average marginal effect
of a city receiving GAP II funding. New abatement technology is associated with
a decrease in pollution monitoring, suggesting that policymakers recognize the
low expected marginal benefit (in terms of documented pollution reductions)
of abatement expenditures. Large public investments in abatement that do not
produce measurable reductions in pollution levels may be considered a political
embarrassment to the ruling coalition.
The robustness of this result can be tested against in the context of a
placebo treatment that specifies the dependent variable as new monitoring stations
opened prior to the 1996 election. If WQMS location is determined by political
considerations in the post election period, those same considerations should be
absent before the election. Table 14 shows the estimated average marginal effect
of close electoral outcomes in the 1996 general election on WQMS location in the
three years prior to the election. Model 1 shows that future electoral considerations
103
Dependent variable:
1[New monitoring station, 3 years post 1996 election]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: New monitoring station within 10km
1[Electoral margin < 3%] −0.026∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.026∗∗∗ −0.022∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Pre-existing monitoring station, 1995 0.012 0.022 0.023 0.028
(0.021) (0.026) (0.025) (0.029)
Population (log) 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.007) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.032 0.029 0.031 0.021
(0.027) (0.027) (0.020) (0.018)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] −0.001 0.005 −0.046 −0.032
(0.021) (0.020) (0.040) (0.036)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.001 −0.0003 −0.001 −0.001
(0.005) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004)
Luminosity growth rate −0.007 −0.001 0.002 0.002
(0.010) (0.007) (0.004) (0.005)
1[GAP II city] −0.022∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.026∗∗ −0.029∗∗
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.012)
Panel B: New monitoring station within 20km
1[Electoral margin < 3%] −0.036∗∗∗ −0.036∗∗∗ −0.033∗∗ −0.038∗∗∗ −0.024
(0.012) (0.012) (0.014) (0.012) (0.018)
Pre-existing monitoring station, 1995 0.017 0.016 0.023 0.030
(0.019) (0.019) (0.020) (0.022)
Population (log) −0.0001 0.001 −0.005 −0.003
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.041 0.036 0.040 0.031
(0.031) (0.030) (0.029) (0.026)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] −0.004 0.001 −0.034 −0.051
(0.026) (0.025) (0.034) (0.041)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.006 0.006 −0.0001 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006)
Luminosity growth rate −0.022 −0.022 −0.009 −0.007
(0.015) (0.016) (0.014) (0.012)
1[GAP II city] −0.030∗∗ −0.034∗∗ −0.030∗∗ −0.035∗∗
(0.015) (0.014) (0.014) (0.014)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates correspond to probit average marginal effects. Standard
error of average marginal effect in parentheses. Dependent variable indicates if a water pollution monitoring
station was constructed within ten (Panel A) or twenty (Panel B) kilometers downstream of a city within
three years after the 1996 election. Other independent variables are described in the Table 8 notes on page
88. All regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table 13. The Effect of Close Elections on the Introduction of Pollution Monitoring
Stations
seem to be predictive of WQMS location, but this estimate is not robust to the
inclusion of other control variables (Models 2–5). Taken as a whole, Table 14
suggests that policymakers were not considering electoral politics when placing
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monitoring stations prior to the period of electoral instability beginning with the
1996 election.
Dependent variable:
1[New monitoring station, 3 years prior to the 1996 election]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
1[Electoral margin < 3%] −0.036∗ 0.005 0.002 −0.016 0.003
(0.020) (0.024) (0.026) (0.023) (0.025)
Pre-existing monitoring station, 1992 −0.075∗∗∗ −0.074∗∗∗ −0.080∗∗∗ −0.080
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.209)
Population (log) 0.087∗∗∗ 0.082∗∗∗ 0.126∗∗∗ 0.106∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.018) (0.028) (0.023)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.241∗∗∗ 0.185∗∗∗ 0.244∗∗∗ 0.191
(0.048) (0.058) (0.047) (0.288)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] −0.070∗ −0.069∗∗∗ −0.103∗∗ −0.089∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.024) (0.047) (0.032)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.075∗∗∗ 0.070∗∗∗ 0.115∗∗∗ 0.094∗∗∗
(0.017) (0.017) (0.026) (0.023)
Luminosity growth rate −0.134∗∗∗ −0.225∗∗∗ −0.092∗∗∗ −0.138∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.041) (0.031) (0.040)
1[GAP II city] −0.064∗∗∗ −0.063∗∗∗ −0.065∗∗∗ −0.064
(0.008) (0.007) (0.008) (1.738)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates correspond to probit average marginal effects. Standard
error of average marginal effect in parentheses. Dependent variable indicates if a water pollution
monitoring station was constructed within ten (Panel A) or twenty (Panel B) kilometers downstream of
a city within three years after the 1996 election. Other independent variables are described in the Table 8
notes on page 88. All regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table 14. The Effect of Close Elections on Pollution Monitoring Stations Prior to
Election (Placebo Test)
Discussion
The unprecedented political uncertainty in India that began in the late
1990s has had long-lasting economic and political consequences for the nation.
The preceding analysis identifies one such consequence: the inefficient allocation
of environmental services and monitoring. However, the source of the inefficiency
is all that has been identified. The magnitude of the inefficiency remains unknown.
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The policy implications of this inefficiency are substantial, and therefore represent
an enticing topic for future research.
Baseline pollution levels in India are high and abatement infrastructure
is inadequate. Given these facts, it is possible that the marginal social benefit of
increased abatement expenditure is universally high throughout the Ganges Basin.
In this case, the inefficiencies created by a clientelist allocation of expenditures may
be low relative to the social benefit.
Alternatively, political pluralism in India is not evenly distributed. Political
affiliation is often predicted by socioeconomic status. Large, diverse cities may
attract more political attention than poorer areas, and these large and diverse cities
might benefit disproportionately from increased abatement expenditure.
A social-welfare-maximizing planner would allocate marginal abatement
expenditures to locations where they would have the largest marginal benefit. But
the planner’s problem is characterized by a high degree of uncertainty about many
relevant factors. The sparsity of the water pollution monitoring network means that
planners have very little basic information on the location of both high-pollution
areas and point sources of pollution. Similarly, the effectiveness of any marginal
expenditure is unknowable in most locations. The paucity of information regarding
water pollution in India leads to one prevailing and inescapable policy conclusion:
the scale of India’s WQMS network must be dramatically increased before any
meaningful discussion of policy effectiveness can take place. Adequate monitoring is
a precondition for efficient allocation of abatement expenditures.
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CHAPTER V
CONCLUSION
The preceding chapters demonstrate various methods for accounting
for economic settings with low quality data. The specific approaches can be
summarized as follows:
1. Careful consideration of the data generating process.
2. The creation of novel datasets.
3. The identification of the areas in which marginal data collection would have
the largest benefit.
As demonstrated in Chapter 2, careful consideration of the data generating
process can yield significant and policy-relevant results in settings where traditional
econometric methods may be biased or misleading. The geographic relationship
between sewage treatment plants and water quality monitoring stations can
be exploited in a spatial econometric model to reduce the bias of treatment
effect estimates. Moreover, the unidirectional nature of rivers allows for specific
parameterizations that are able to produce significant estimates of water pollution
reduction that can be attributed to the construction of sewage treatment plants. I
also find that the effectiveness of sewage treatment plants tends to diminish over
time, a pattern that is in agreement with anecdotal evidence of poor management
and a lack of oversight of the treatment facilities.
The second approach to accounting for low-quality data is conceptually
straight-forward: create data that is of higher quality. Many terabytes of data
that span the entire globe are recorded by satellites each day, and much of it is
freely available to researchers. Chapter 3 introduces a method for transforming that
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data into high-resolution statistics that closely track a variety demographic and
economic outcomes. The resulting data offers a middle ground between aggregated
statistics, as recorded by censuses or surveys, and direct data collection as part of
a costly randomized control trial. The algorithm I propose is demonstrated using
census data from Uganda, and I show that commonly used aggregate measures of
economic welfare mask a considerable amount of heterogeneity at the pixel level.
Finally, I show that existing data sources can be used to illuminate domains
in which increased data collection will have the most marginal impact. Chapter
4 identifies the inefficient allocation of pollution abatement expenditures and
pollution monitoring that results from political considerations following the 1996
general election of India. I find that electorally competitive cities in the Ganges
basin in the aftermath of the election were more likely to receive funding for
pollution abatement from the federal government of India, and that these same
cities were less likely to receive increased water pollution monitoring after the
1996 election. However, pollution monitoring is inconsistent and inadequate, which
precludes estimation of the consequences of the inefficient allocations.
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APPENDIX
ADDITIONAL TABLES
Dependent variable:
1[GAP II city]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Linear Probability Model
1[Electoral margin < 3%] 0.091∗∗ 0.087∗∗ 0.105∗∗ 0.090∗∗ 0.105∗∗
(0.038) (0.043) (0.042) (0.042) (0.043)
Population (log) 0.066∗∗∗ 0.069∗∗∗ 0.066∗∗∗ 0.065∗∗∗
(0.021) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.073∗ 0.091∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.097∗∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.044) (0.043)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.087∗∗ 0.079∗∗ 0.067∗ 0.085∗∗
(0.034) (0.032) (0.036) (0.036)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.016 0.010 0.012 0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.010) (0.009)
Luminosity growth rate 0.015 0.016 0.016 0.013
(0.016) (0.013) (0.016) (0.013)
1[GAP I city] 0.652∗∗∗ 0.653∗∗∗ 0.655∗∗∗ 0.646∗∗∗
(0.067) (0.075) (0.070) (0.076)
Panel B: Logit
1[Electoral margin < 3%] 0.091∗∗ 0.092∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗ 0.101∗∗∗ 0.131∗∗
(0.045) (0.038) (0.047) (0.039) (0.051)
Population (log) 0.082∗∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.078∗ 0.065∗
(0.038) (0.034) (0.044) (0.038)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.057∗ 0.070∗∗ 0.064∗∗ 0.078∗∗
(0.030) (0.031) (0.030) (0.033)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.106∗∗∗ 0.104∗∗∗ 0.092∗∗∗ 0.130∗∗∗
(0.030) (0.028) (0.032) (0.039)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.039 0.022 0.033 0.021
(0.030) (0.030) (0.040) (0.036)
Luminosity growth rate 0.024∗∗ 0.020∗∗ 0.024∗ 0.017∗
(0.012) (0.009) (0.012) (0.010)
1[GAP I city] 0.892∗∗∗ 0.869∗∗∗ 0.884∗∗∗ 0.866∗∗∗
(0.013) (0.019) (0.015) (0.017)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates for the logit model correspond to average
marginal effects. Standard errors in Panel A are heteroskedastic-robust. Standard errors in Panel
B are estimated for the average marginal effects. Dependent variable indicates if a city received
funding from the GAP II program. Other independent variables are described in the Table 8 notes
on page 88. All regressions have n = 631 observations.
Table A.15. The Effect of Close Elections on GAP II Funding, LPM and Logit
Models
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Dependent variable:
1[New monitoring station, 3 years post election]
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Panel A: Linear Probability Model
1[Electoral margin < 3%] −0.026∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.021 −0.023∗∗∗ −0.014
(0.014) (0.008) (0.015) (0.009) (0.015)
Population (log) 0.003 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.028 0.032 0.032 0.025
(0.019) (0.020) (0.020) (0.020)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] 0.006 0.007 −0.028 −0.022
(0.012) (0.021) (0.019) (0.023)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.002 0.001 0.001 −0.0003
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Luminosity growth rate −0.003 −0.0001 0.002 0.003
(0.006) (0.005) (0.006) (0.006)
1[GAP I city] −0.034 −0.018 −0.011 −0.008
(0.026) (0.028) (0.031) (0.032)
1[GAP II city] −0.017 −0.028 −0.025 −0.032
(0.016) (0.018) (0.019) (0.020)
Panel B: Logit
1[Electoral margin < 3%] −0.026∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.024∗∗∗ −0.025∗∗∗ −0.023∗∗∗
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006)
Population (log) 0.005 0.005 0.006 0.006
(0.005) (0.005) (0.004) (0.005)
1[Distance from major river < 20km] 0.032 0.029 0.033 0.021
(0.030) (0.028) (0.024) (0.020)
1[Distance from major river < 50km] −0.001 0.006 −0.050 −0.035
(0.023) (0.020) (0.052) (0.046)
Per capita luminosity, 1995 0.002 0.0005 0.0003 0.001
(0.005) (0.002) (0.002) (0.002)
Luminosity growth rate −0.005 −0.0003 0.002 0.002
(0.017) (0.007) (0.003) (0.003)
1[GAP I city] −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗ −0.020∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.006)
1[GAP II city] −0.018∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.020∗∗ −0.021∗∗
(0.009) (0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Winning Party FE No No Yes No Yes
State FE No No No Yes Yes
Notes: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01. Estimates for the logit model correspond to average marginal
effects. Standard errors in Panel A are heteroskedastic-robust. Standard errors in Panel B are estimated
for the average marginal effects. Dependent variable indicates if a water pollution monitoring station
was constructed within ten kilometers downstream of a city within three years of the election. Other
independent variables are described in the Table 8 notes on page 88. All regressions have n = 631
observations.
Table A.16. The Effect of Close Elections on the Introduction of Pollution
Monitoring Stations, Linear Probability Model and Logit Specifications
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